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Legal Responses and Countermeasures to National 
Security Letters 
Brett Weinstein

 
INTRODUCTION 
In early June of 2013, governmental surveillance suddenly and 
dramatically entered the public consciousness, prompting a torrent of 
debate and backlash. The Guardian published a top secret court order 
requiring Verizon to hand over all telephone call records to the 
National Security Agency (NSA); the Washington Post disclosed a 
secret but widespread Internet surveillance program, and months of 
similar revelations followed, all stemming from leaks by former NSA 
contractor, Edward Snowden.
1
 As a result, the public and the press 
began to question the tools that the government uses for surveillance, 
including National Security Letters (NSLs), and the relationship 
between the government and the technology and telecommunications 
companies that seemingly possess all personal and private 
information generated in the modern, digital world.
2
  
 
  J.D. (2015), Washington University School of Law; B.A. (2010), Emory University. 
Thanks to Professor Neil Richards for his guidance regarding this Note, the Journal staff for 
assistance editing, my grandfather, Max Weinstein, for proofreading, and my parents, family, 
and others for their ideas, encouragement, and support. 
 1. Glenn Greenwald, NSA collecting phone records of millions of Verizon customers 
daily, THE GUARDIAN (June 5, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/nsa-
phone-records-verizon-court-order, available at http://perma.cc/DU3S-28JB; Barton Gellman & 
Laura Poitras, U.S., British intelligence mining data from nine U.S. Internet companies in broad 
secret program, WASH. POST (June 6, 2013), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-06-
06/news/39784046_1_prism-nsa-u-s-servers, available at http://perma.cc/QNJ5-E3FF; Paul 
Szoldra, SNOWDEN: Here’s Everything We’ve Learned In One Year Of Unprecedented Top-
Secret Leaks, BUS. INSIDER (June 7, 2014), http://www.businessinsider.com/snowden-leaks-
timeline-2014-6, available at http://perma.cc/RM6G-Y2Q9; Matthew Cole & Mike Brunker, 
Edward Snowden: A Timeline, NBC NEWS (May 26, 2014), http://www.nbcnews.com/feature/ 
edward-snowden-interview/edward-snowden-timeline-n114871, available at http://perma.cc/ 
2WP5-QNG6. 
 2. The New York Times editorial board stated, “[T]he administration has now lost all 
credibility on this issue. Mr. Obama is proving the truism that the executive branch will use any 
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Facing pressure from customers and the public, businesses were 
pressed to explain publically what records the government secretly 
requests, how often it makes such requests, and how often they 
comply.
3
 The government prohibited businesses from publicly 
disclosing the answers to these questions, but several major 
technology companies filed lawsuits hoping to allow disclosure of 
these figures.
4
 Several smaller, privacy-focused companies also faced 
governmental demands for user data or cooperation and chose to 
either cease functioning or change their business practices in an effort 
to avoid compromising their customers’ expectation of privacy.5  
 
power it is given and very likely abuse it.” Editorial Board, President Obama’s Dragnet, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 6, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/07/opinion/president-obamas-dragnet. 
html?pagewanted=all, available at http://perma.cc/F5BB-67BW. The editorial board expressed 
even more distrust two months later, stating,  
Apparently no espionage tool that Congress gives the National Security Agency is big 
enough or intrusive enough to satisfy the agency’s inexhaustible appetite for delving 
into the communications of Americans. Time and again, the N.S.A. has pushed past 
the limits that lawmakers thought they had imposed to prevent it from invading basic 
privacy, as guaranteed by the Constitution. 
Editorial Board, Breaking Through Limits on Spying, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 8, 2013), http://www. 
nytimes.com/2013/08/09/opinion/breaking-through-limits-on-spying.html, available at http:// 
perma.cc/3BZL-RUXP. New organizations were founded to oppose surveillance, such as 
Restore the Fourth and Stop Watching Us. RESTORE THE FOURTH, FAQ, http://www. 
restorethe4th.com/faq/ (last visited Dec. 24, 2014); STOP WATCHING US, Frequently Asked 
Questions, https://rally. stopwatching.us/faq.html (last visited Dec. 24, 2013). A little over a 
year following Snowden’s disclosures, a poll found most American citizens felt it unacceptable 
for the US government to monitor American citizen’s communications. PEW RESEARCH CTR., 
Global Opinions of U.S. Surveillance: United States (July 14, 2014), http://www.pewglobal. 
org/2014/07/14/nsa-opinion/country/united-states/, available at http://perma.cc/8HMY-WTSY. 
 3. The government allowed Google to publish a wide range of the number of NSLs it 
receives yearly prior to Snowden’s revelations—between zero and 999. However, the 
technology companies sought to disclose these numbers in greater detail. David Kravets, 
Google Says the FBI Is Secretly Spying on Some of Its Customers, WIRED (Mar. 5, 2013), 
http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2013/03/google-nsl-range/, available at http://perma.cc/ 
8V25-7U88; Kim Zetter, Google Seeks OK From Feds to Disclose Stats on Secret Court 
Orders, WIRED (June 13, 2013), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2013/06/google-fisa-
requests/, available at http://perma.cc/EFB2-9U2N.  
 4. Ewen MacAskill, Yahoo files lawsuit against NSA over user data requests, THE 
GUARDIAN (Sept. 9, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/09/yahoo-lawsuit-nsa-
surveillance-requests, available at http://perma.cc/GSE9-2U7U; Liz Gannes, U.S. Opposes 
Tech Companies’ Requests to Disclose Surveillance, ALL THINGS D (Oct. 2, 2013), 
http://allthingsd.com/20131002/u-s-opposes-tech-companies-requests-to-disclose-surveillance/, 
available at http://perma.cc/WVL7-9BXL. 
 5. Russell Brandom, Lavabit vs. the FBI: the fight for the soul of American Software, 
THE VERGE (Oct. 7, 2013), http://www.theverge.com/2013/10/7/4812102/lavabit-and-the-fight-
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol47/iss1/15
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The government has several tools at its disposal when it seeks to 
obtain information as part of a national security investigation. First, it 
may use a traditional grand jury subpoena, however, the recipient is 
usually under no obligation to keep the subpoena secret.
6
 Second, the 
government may seek an order from the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Court (FISC), which the recipient must keep secret, for 
the production of documents or things.
7
 Finally, the government may, 
without any judicial review or approval, issue an NSL to compel a 
recipient to produce certain kinds of records while keeping the 
issuance of the NSL a secret.
8
 NSLs are often deployed at the 
beginning of national security investigations to determine who a 
suspected terrorist is associated with.
9
 In addition to furthering a 
national security investigation, the information gained from an NSL 
can then be used for a more onerous Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act application.
10
 
Although neither judicial review nor approval is required, the 
government must certify that the records sought through an NSL are 
for use in a national security investigation.
11
 NSLs are usually issued 
by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the records sought 
can include subscriber information, toll billing information, and other 
electronic communication transaction records.
12
 
 
for-the-soul-of-american-software, available at http://perma.cc/FRL3-HYHV; Joe Mullin, After 
Lavabit Shutdown, Another Encrypted E-Mail Service Closes, ARS TECHNICA (Aug. 9, 2013), 
http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/08/in-wake-of-lavabit-shutdown-another-secure-e-mail 
-service-goes-offline/, available at http://perma.cc/XT4F-7PVN; Russell Brandom, Cryptoseal 
Shuts Down Consumer VPN Service Over Legal Concerns, THE VERGE (Oct. 22, 2013), 
http://www.theverge.com/2013/10/22/4866362/cryptoseal-shuts-down-consumer-vpn-service-
over-lavabit-concerns, available at http://perma.cc/H25K-EZA6; Jon Brodkin, CryptoSeal VPN 
Shuts Down Rather Than Risk NSA Demands for Crypto Keys, ARS TECHNICA (Oct. 21, 2013), 
http://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2013/10/cryptoseal-vpn-shuts-down-rather-than-
risk-nsa-demands-for-crypto-keys/, available at http://perma.cc/X2TT-9L5K.  
 6. DAVID S. KRIS & J. DOUGLAS WILSON, NATIONAL SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS AND 
PROSECUTIONS § 20:1 (updated Aug. 2014). A grand jury subpoena may be inappropriate for 
national security investigations because the recipient of the subpoena is not barred from making 
disclosures, though the grand jurors are. Id. 
 7. Id.; see infra note 74 and accompanying text. 
 8. Kris & Wilson, supra note 6, § 20:1. 
 9. Id. § 20:2. 
 10. Id.; Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA), 50 U.S.C.A. §§ 1801 to 
1871 (West 2010). 
 11. Kris & Wilson, supra note 6, § 20:2. 
 12. Id. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
220 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 47:217 
 
 
There are five distinct NSL statutes,
13
 but most NSLs are issued 
under 18 U.S.C. § 2709 to communications firms—including Internet 
service providers (ISPs), telephone companies, universities, libraries, 
businesses, political organizations, and charities.
14
 The NSL’s 
prohibition on revealing to anyone that a request had been made is 
popularly referred to as a “gag order.”15 Although ostensibly aimed at 
foreign counterintelligence and terrorism, relaxed standards allow 
any person’s information to be requested so long as field officers 
certify, without providing any specific facts, that a target’s data will 
be used to “protect against international terrorism or clandestine 
intelligence activities.”16 
The development of NSLs is rooted in the Right to Financial 
Privacy Act of 1978.
17
 Originally weaker than a standard subpoena, 
they were strengthened over time and extended in the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA), which created 18 
U.S.C. § 2709, the statute underlying the communications record 
 
 13. 12 U.S.C.A. § 3414(a)(5)(A) (West 2006) (part of the Right to Financial Privacy Act 
(RFPA) allowing the FBI to request records from financial institutions); 15 U.S.C.A. 
§ 1681u(a) & (b) (West 2006) and 15 U.S.C.A. § 1681v(a) (West 2006) (provisions of the Fair 
Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), which allow the government to request records from consumer 
reporting agencies); 18 U.S.C.A. § 2709(a) (West 2006) (part of the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) allowing the FBI to require a “wire or electronic 
communication service provider” to provide “subscriber information and toll billing 
information” and “electronic communication transaction records”; 50 U.S.C.A. § 3162 (West) 
(allowing the government to obtain records to investigate government employees suspected of 
improperly disclosing classified information). 
 14. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T OF JUSTICE, A REVIEW OF THE FBI’S USE OF 
NAT’L SEC. LETTERS: ASSESSMENT OF CORRECTIVE ACTIONS AND EXAMINATION OF NSL 
USAGE IN 2006 (2008), at 107, http://www.justice.gov/oig/special/s0803b/final.pdf; Andrew E. 
Nieland, Note, National Security Letters and the Amended Patriot Act, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 
1201, 1214 (2007). 
 15. Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Constitutionality of National Security Letters Issued 
Pursuant to 18 U.S.C.A. § 2709, 25 A.L.R. FED. 2d 547 (2008); Nieland, supra note 14, at 1204 
(describing current NSL statutes, including gag order provisions). NSLs may be used only to 
obtain subscriber, toll billing information, and other electronic communication transaction 
records. Kris & Wilson, supra note 6, § 20:8. A gag order forbids “public comment about a 
pending criminal case.” 75 Am. Jur. Trial § 138 (2014). 
 16. USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 505(a)(2)(B), 115 Stat. 272, 365 
(2001) (amending 18 U.S.C. § 2709(b) (1986) which used the far more narrow scope of 
“authorized foreign counterintelligence investigation[s]”); Patrick P. Garlinger, Note, Privacy, 
Free Speech, and the Patriot Act: First and Fourth Amendment Limits on National Security 
Letters, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1105, 1111 (2009). 
 17. Nieland, supra note 14, at 1207. “Ironically, the national security letter . . . originated 
in legislation designed to safeguard individual privacy.” Id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol47/iss1/15
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NSL.
18
 The USA PATRIOT Act, signed into law on October 26, 
2001, bolstered the government’s ability to use NSLs to demand 
information by weakening the requirement for individualized 
suspicion and increasing the number of agents who can certify the 
need for an NSL.
19
 As a result, the use of NSLs has since 
skyrocketed.
20
 A 2006 amendment to the PATRIOT Act altered 18 
U.S.C. § 2709, making changes to the gag order and creating a 
pathway for judicial review.
21
 Companies that cooperate with NSLs 
in good faith are shielded from liability by various statutes.
22
 
 
 18. Id. at 1208-09. ECPA was intended to give significant consideration to individual 
privacy, forbidding government agencies from obtaining “stored electronic communications 
information” without the customer’s permission, unless it did so “through compulsory process, 
such as a subpoena, warrant, or court order.” Id. at 1209 (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(citing Doe v. Ashcroft, 334 F. Supp. 2d 471, 481 (2004)). However, ECPA also created the 
exception to the requirement of a subpoena in 18 U.S.C. § 2709(a), which allowed records to be 
demanded so long as four factors were met. Id. at 1209–10. First, requests could only be made 
to wire or electronic communication services providers. Id. Second, obtainable information was 
limited to subscriber information and toll billing records information. Id. Third, the FBI had to 
certify that the information was relevant to an authorized foreign counterintelligence 
investigation and there were specific and articulable facts giving reason to believe that the 
person or entity to whom the information sought pertains is a foreign power or an agent of a 
foreign power. Id. Fourth, only the Director of the FBI or an individual within the FBI 
designated for this purpose by the Director could make this certification. Id. 
 19. Id. at 1211. As a result of these changes, “an FBI agent could (and still can) issue an 
NSL upon internal certification that the information sought is ‘relevant to an authorized 
investigation to protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities.’” Id. 
(quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2709(b)). 
 20. National Security Letters-NSL Statistics, ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFORMATION 
CENTER, http://epic.org/privacy/nsl/#stats (last visited Oct. 23, 2013); See U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., A REVIEW OF THE FED. BUREAU OF 
INVESTIGATION’S USE OF NAT’L SEC. LETTERS 36–38 (2007), available at http://www.justice. 
gov/oig/special/s0703b/final.pdf. 
 21. USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-177, 
120 Stat. 192 (Mar. 9, 2006); Zitter, supra note 15. The amendments did away with the blanket 
prohibition on disclosure regarding NSLs under § 2709(c) and replaced it with a mechanism for 
a case-by-case determination by the FBI of the need for a gag order. Id. The 2006 amendments 
also created a mechanism for judicial review of nondisclosure orders issued under § 2709(c). 
See infra note 201–202 and accompanying text.  
 22. See 12 U.S.C.A. § 3417(c) (West 2006); 18 U.S.C.A. § 2703(e) (West 2006); 15 
U.S.C.A. § 1681u(k) (West 2006); 15 U.S.C.A. § 1681v(e) (West 2006); 50 U.S.C.A. 
§ 3162(c)(2) (West); see also DAVID P. FIDLER & SARAH JANE HUGHES, RESPONDING TO 
NATIONAL SECURITY LETTERS: A PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR LEGAL COUNSEL 72–73 (2009). 
However, companies must take care to ensure they have acted in good faith. See infra note 217 
and accompanying text. 
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Critics have condemned NSLs as unnecessary, subject to abuse, 
and unconstitutional on both First and Fourth Amendment grounds.
23
 
NSLs requesting information about a person do not implicate that 
person’s Fourth Amendment rights under the so-called “third party 
doctrine.”24 The third party doctrine, first described in United States 
v. Miller
25
 and more fully developed in Smith v. Maryland,
26
 
“provides that if information is possessed or known by third parties, 
then, for purposes of the Fourth Amendment, an individual lacks a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the information.”27 The First 
 
 23. Among the critics is the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), which stated, 
The ACLU’s legal challenge argues that the amended law violates the First and Fourth 
Amendments because it does not impose adequate safeguards on the FBI’s authority to 
force disclosure of sensitive and constitutionally protected information. The lawsuit 
also challenges the constitutionality of the statute’s gag provision, which prohibits 
anyone who receives an NSL from disclosing even the mere fact that the FBI has 
sought information. 
Challenge to National Security Letter Authority, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (Sept. 29, 2004), 
https://www.aclu.org/national-security/challenge-national-security-letter-authority, available at 
https://perma.cc/F3GT-MLHY; the Electronic Frontier Foundation, also a critic, and stated, 
In 2013, EFF won a landmark decision in the Northern District of California in which 
Judge Susan Illston declared one of the statutes unconstitutional in its entirety. EFF’s 
petition, brought on behalf of an unidentified telephone service provider, challenged 
both the underlying authority to obtain customer records as well as the concurrent gag 
provision that prevented the recipient from disclosing even that it had receiving an 
NSL. 
National Security Letters, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., https://www.eff.org/issues/national-
security-letters (last visited Oct. 24, 2013), available at https://perma.cc/QM8Q-7MQH; the 
Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) has stated that, in light of NSL abuses, the NSL 
statutes “should be repealed.” Letter from the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) to 
Senators Patrick Leahy and Arlen Specter, Committee of the Judiciary Members, (Mar. 21, 
2007) (https://epic.org/privacy/pdf/nsl_letter.pdf, available at https://perma.cc/Z5RE-YNGE). 
Additionally, critics have speculated that the government is using NSLs for bulk collection of 
Americans’ information, rather than targeting specific individuals. Marcy Wheeler, The FBI (or 
NSA?)’s Bulk National Security Letters, EMPTYWHEEL (Jan. 8, 2014), https://www.emptywheel. 
net/2014/01/08/the-fbi-or-nsas-bulk-national-security-letters/, available at https://perma.cc/ 
X49Q-U5UE. 
 24. Garlinger, supra note 16, at 1105; see also Daniel J. Solove, The First Amendment As 
Criminal Procedure, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 112, 125–27 (2007) (explaining that under the third 
party doctrine, “the Fourth Amendment does not provide protection when the government seeks 
information about a person from a third party, whether through a subpoena or through some 
other means.”). 
 25. 425 U.S. 435 (1976). 
 26. 442 U.S. 735 (1979). 
 27. Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 528 (2006). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol47/iss1/15
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Amendment is therefore the primary pathway for challenging NSLs, 
although several recent cases have made Fourth Amendment 
challenges once again colorable.
28
  
The Office of the Inspector General (OIG) in the US Department 
of Justice (DOJ) found widespread misuse of NSLs from 2003 to 
2006, including obtaining records and information regarding the 
wrong individuals, seeking records not permitted by statute 
(including educational records and associations with campus 
organizations), issuing letters without following statutorily required 
protocol, and issuing NSLs after authority to do so expired.
29
 
Moreover, the FBI used information gleaned from NSLs to 
investigate targets’ “communities of interest”—“the network of 
people that the target was in contact with.”30 NSLs have also been 
used to unearth journalists’ sources.31 Perhaps the most egregious 
example occurred where the FISC specifically rejected an FBI 
application for a FISA order due to First Amendment concerns and 
the FBI simply issued NSLs instead, even though statutes proscribe 
the use of NSLs in certain cases implicating the First Amendment.
32
 
In 2008 the OIG of the DOJ estimated that there were as many as 
6,400 incidents of abuse using NSLs.
33
 
In December 2013, the President’s Review Group on Intelligence 
and Communications Technologies, created by President Obama 
shortly after the Snowden revelations, issued recommendations 
 
 28. See discussion infra Part I. 
 29. A REVIEW OF THE FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION’S USE OF NAT’L SEC. LETTERS, 
supra note 14, at 83. 
 30. Eric Lichtblau, F.B.I. Data Mining Reached Beyond Initial Targets, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 
9, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/09/washington/09fbi.html?pagewanted=all, available 
at http://perma.cc/Q5G8-LSGG. 
 31. Trevor Timm, When Can the FBI Use National Security Letters to Go After 
Journalists? That’s Classified, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS FOUND. (Sept. 3, 2014), https:// 
freedom.press/blog/2014/09/when-can-fbi-use-national-security-letters-go-after-journalists-thats-
classified, available at https://perma.cc/6QER-PT3U. 
 32. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T OF JUSTICE, A REVIEW OF THE FBI’S USE OF 
SECTION 215 ORDERS FOR BUSINESS RECORDS IN 2006 (2008), at 65, http://www.justice.gov/ 
oig/reports/2014/215-II.pdf. 
 33. Jason Ryan, FBI Search Abuses Could Number Thousands, ABC NEWS (Apr. 16, 
2008), http://abcnews.go.com/TheLaw/DOJ/story?id=4661216, available at http://perma.cc/ 
SW3W-MTCQ. 
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regarding how to reform surveillance practices.
34
 The report 
recommended that NSL statutes be significantly altered to require 
specific judicial findings before NSLs can be issued.
35
  
 Courts reviewing NSLs have disagreed about the constitutionality 
of several provisions of the NSL-enabling statutes.
36
 Despite most 
recently having been declared unconstitutional, the statutes 
authorizing NSLs still stand, the FBI continues to issue NSLs, and 
the President and members of the national security and intelligence 
communities describe NSLs as vital to preventing terrorist strikes in 
America.
37
 
This Note describes what strategies and countermeasures 
American entities (including businesses, organizations, and 
individuals) have used and can use to minimize or avoid their 
exposure to NSLs. Additionally, this Note describes what American 
 
 34. PRESIDENT’S REV. GRP. ON INTELL. & COMMC’NS TECHS, Liberty and Security in a 
Changing World (2013) available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2013-
12-12_rg_final_report.pdf, also available at http://perma.cc/9R4D-VTLH. 
 35. Id. Specifically, the Report recommended that “statutes that authorize the issuance of 
National Security Letters should be amended to permit the issuance of National Security Letters 
only upon a judicial finding that: (1) the government has reasonable grounds to believe that the 
particular information sought is relevant to an authorized investigation intended to protect 
‘against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities’ and (2) like a subpoena, 
the order is reasonable in focus, scope, and breadth.” Id. at 24. 
 36. See generally Zitter, supra note 15 (compiling cases both supporting and questioning 
the legality of NSLs). 
 37. President Obama stated, “the FBI also relies on what’s called national security letters 
. . .” President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on Review of Signals Intelligence 
(Jan. 17 2014, 11:15 AM), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/01/ 
17/remarks-president-review-signals-intelligence, also available at http://perma.cc/T8YZ-
AAF7. In 2014, FBI Director James Comey stated “[t]he national security letter is . . . a very 
important building block tool of our national security investigations." He added, “[w]hat 
worries me about their suggestion that we impose a judicial procedure on NSLs, is that it would 
actually make it harder for us to do national security investigations than bank fraud 
investigations.” Josh Gerstein, FBI chief warns on intel reforms, Snowden, POLITICO (Jan. 9, 
2014), http://www.politico.com/blogs/under-the-radar/2014/01/fbi-chief-warns-on-intel-reforms-
snowden-180920.html, available at http://perma.cc/UL9T-6ERU. The Acting Assistant 
Attorney General for National Security in the Department of Justice in a 2011 statement wrote, 
“I’ll address in detail one type of investigative tool . . . that remains critical to our ability to 
keep the country safe: national security letters.” Hearing on the Permanent Provisions of the 
Patriot Act Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Sec. of the H. Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 12-13 (2011) (statement of Todd Hinnen, acting Assistant Attorney 
General for National Security, Department of Justice), available at http://www.gpo.gov/ 
fdsys/pkg/CHRG-112hhrg65486/pdf/CHRG-112hhrg65486.pdf, also available at http://perma.cc/ 
A2UZ-6DHM. 
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entities can do if they receive an NSL, regardless of the letter’s 
constitutionality.  
Part I of this Note briefly examines past court rulings and current 
litigation regarding NSLs. Part II discusses the disclosure of 
aggregate statistics of issued NSLs. Part III explores potential 
countermeasures to NSLs (assuming the letters are constitutional), 
including a warrant canary, anonymization of user data, use of Tor, 
avoiding US jurisdiction, using alternative networks and protocols, 
and challenging the NSL itself. It also discusses cases that bear on 
these countermeasures and briefly explores the repercussions of not 
complying. Part IV analyzes the likelihood of success in utilizing 
each of these countermeasures and concludes that 
telecommunications companies should collect as little information as 
possible, and entities should choose to use those telecommunications 
companies that have committed to protecting user data. 
I. HISTORY: NSL LITIGATION AND COURT RULINGS 
The leading case on Fourth Amendment searches is Katz v. United 
States.
38
 Under the test articulated in Katz, the “Fourth Amendment 
protects privacy, not property, and . . . it protects privacy primarily by 
answering the normative question of when an expectation of privacy 
should be deemed constitutionally ‘reasonable.’”39 
In 2012 the Supreme Court in United States v. Jones held that the 
government’s attachment of a Global Positioning System (GPS) 
device to a vehicle, and its use of that device to monitor the vehicle’s 
movements, constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment.
40
 
However, the majority opinion did not merely conduct a Katz 
analysis. Indeed, the Court stated that the defendant’s “Fourth 
Amendment rights do not rise or fall with the Katz formulation” 
concerning a reasonable expectation of privacy.
41
 The Court 
emphasized the importance of the government’s trespass necessary to 
 
 38. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
 39. Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths 
and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 816 (2004). 
 40. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012). 
 41. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 950. 
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install the device.
42
 The Court decided the case under the theory that 
a vehicle is an “effect” per the Fourth Amendment, and using a 
device to monitor the vehicle’s movements, constitutes a “search.”43 
Many additional cases have brought the Fourth Amendment into 
the electronic age. In Gonzales v. Google, Inc., the government 
sought to compel Google to turn over a massive number of user 
searches.
44
 Google argued that it would be unduly burdened by loss 
of user trust if forced to produce users’ queries.45 A district court in 
Northern California agreed with Google and held that “there is a 
potential burden as to Google’s loss of goodwill if Google is forced 
to disclose search queries to the Government.”46 
In United States v. Warshak, the Sixth Circuit held that a criminal 
defendant enjoys a reasonable expectation of privacy in his email, 
even when an ISP possesses it.
47
 Government agents therefore 
violated the Fourth Amendment by compelling the ISP to turn over 
emails without first obtaining a warrant based on probable cause.
48
 
Litigation regarding NSLs is largely under seal and often heavily 
redacted due to the secrecy provisions of the NSL statutes and 
governmental claims regarding national security.
49
 Nonetheless, a 
 
 42. Id. at 949–53. Justice Sotomayor’s concurring opinion, however, justified the outcome 
using the Katz test, explaining that the test can stand side-by-side with the trespass theory. See 
id. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (stating that “Katz ‘s reasonable-expectation-of-privacy 
test augmented, but did not displace or diminish, the common-law trespassory test that preceded 
it.”). 
 43. Id. at 949. The Court also stated, “[s]ituations involving merely the transmission of 
electronic signals without trespass would remain subject to Katz analysis.” Id. at 953 (emphasis 
in original). 
 44. 234 F.R.D. 674, 682 (N.D. Cal. 2006). 
 45. Id. at 683–84. 
 46. Id. 
 47. 631 F.3d 266, 288 (6th Cir. 2010). 
 48. Id. The government’s attempt to compel the ISP to turn over the email was based on a 
portion of the Stored Communications Act (itself a portion of ECPA), 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701 et seq. 
Id. at 282. 
 49. See, e.g., Tim Cushing, Government Forces Free Press Advocacy Group To File Its 
Amicus Brief In NSL Case Under Seal, TECHDIRT (Apr. 14, 2014), https://www.techdirt. 
com/articles/20140410/09452626868/government-forces-free-press-advocacy-group-to-file-its-
amicus-brief-nsl-case-under-seal.shtml, available at https://perma.cc/5BK5-T35M; see also 
ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., EFF Fights National Security Letter Demands on Behalf of Telecom, 
Internet Company (Mar. 3, 2014), https://www.eff.org/press/releases/eff-fights-national-
security-letter-demands-behalf-telecom-internet-company (noting that the challengers to an 
NSL “remain under seal because the government continues to insist that even identifying the 
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number of cases have analyzed the constitutionality of NSL-enabling 
statutes.
50
 Doe v. Ashcroft,
51
 brought by the American Civil Liberties 
Union (ACLU) and an anonymous ISP, first evaluated the 
constitutionality of NSLs.
52
 The ISP received an NSL but refused to 
comply. The district court judge awarded summary judgment for the 
plaintiffs and held the NSL provisions unconstitutional.
53
 The court 
found that the NSL provision violated the Fourth Amendment as 
applied.
54
 Additionally, the disclosure bar was not narrowly tailored 
to further the government’s interest in protecting the integrity and 
efficacy of international terrorism and counterintelligence 
investigations, in violation of First Amendment free speech 
protections.
55
 The Court found the disclosure bar was not severable 
from the NSL provision.
56
 Additionally, the Court found that the NSL 
statutes had “the effect of authorizing coercive searches effectively 
immune from any judicial process.”57 
The DOJ filed an appeal, but before the court reached a decision, 
Congress passed the USA PATRIOT Act Reauthorization Act,
58
 
requiring government certification that the matter pertains to national 
security, allowing for disclosure to a recipient’s lawyer, and creating 
 
companies involved might endanger national security.”), available at https://perma.cc/9ZJ8-
KV2M. 
 50. See generally Zitter, supra note 15 (discussing NSL cases). 
 51. 334 F. Supp. 2d 471 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). Many of the NSL cases follow the naming 
pattern of Doe v. [the name of the Attorney General at the time of the lawsuit].  
 52. The ISP was later revealed to be Calyx Internet Access and its president, Nicholas 
Merrill. Kim Zetter, ‘John Doe’ Who Fought FBI Spying Freed From Gag Order After 6 Years, 
WIRED (Aug. 10, 2010), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2010/08/nsl-gag-order-lifted/#ixzz0 
wcPM40Dg, available at http://perma.cc/P3BN-46LS. 
 53. Doe v. Ashcroft, 334 F. Supp. 2d at 526–27. 
 54. Id. A court may declare a statute unconstitutional on its face, or, more commonly, as 
applied. Where a court holds a statute unconstitutional on its face, “the state may not enforce it 
under any circumstances, unless an appropriate court narrows its application; in contrast, when 
a court holds a statute unconstitutional as applied to particular facts, the state may enforce the 
statute in different circumstances.” Michael C. Dorf, Facial Challenges to State and Federal 
Statutes, 46 STAN. L. REV. 235, 236 (1994). Importantly, “a facial challenge to a statute will fail 
if the statute has any constitutional application.” Id. at 239 (citing United States v. Salerno, 481 
U.S. 739, 745 (1987)). 
 55. Ashcroft, 334 F. Supp. 2d at 516. At the time the NSL provisions forbade an NSL 
recipient from consulting with any party, including an attorney, and did not permit any judicial 
review. Nieland, supra note 14, at 1215. 
 56. Ashcroft, 334 F. Supp. 2d at 526–27. 
 57. Id. at 506. 
 58. Pub. L. No. 109-177, 120 Stat. 192 (Mar. 9, 2006). 
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a pathway for judicial review.
59
 After reaching the Second Circuit, 
the case was remanded, and the district court again held the surviving 
portion of the challenge unconstitutional on First Amendment 
grounds.
60
  
In John Doe, Inc. v. Mukasey,
61
 the Second Circuit affirmed the 
district court decision in part, holding that because the gag order 
accompanying an NSL is a restraint on expression imposed prior to 
judicial review, it must be subject to strict scrutiny.
62
 Further, the 
court held that a statutorily created, mandatory standard of review 
and level of deference to a government certification of the need for a 
gag order is unconstitutional.
63
 While the court allowed part of the 
NSL provisions to stand, it enjoined “FBI officials from enforcing the 
nondisclosure requirement of section 2709(c) in the absence of 
Government-initiated judicial review.”64 
In 2011, on behalf of an unnamed NSL recipient, the Electronic 
Frontier Foundation (EFF) brought a new challenge to NSLs in In Re 
National Security Letter.
65
 On March 14, 2013, the District Court for 
 
 59. Kris & Wilson, supra note 6, § 20:10. 
 60. The Court stated,  
§ 2709(c) is unconstitutional under the First Amendment because it functions as a 
licensing scheme that does not afford adequate procedural safeguards, and because it is 
not a sufficiently narrowly tailored restriction on protected speech. Because the Court 
finds that § 2709(c) cannot be severed from the remainder of the statute, the Court 
finds the entirety of § 2709 unconstitutional. Additionally, the Court concludes that 
§ 3511(b) is unconstitutional under the First Amendment and the doctrine of 
separation of powers. 
Doe v. Gonzales, 500 F. Supp. 2d 379, 425 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) aff’d in part, rev’d in part and 
remanded sub nom. Before this decision the challenging ISP abandoned the Fourth Amendment 
challenge, and the Second Circuit therefore vacated that portion of the District Court’s opinion 
on appeal. Doe v. Gonzales, 449 F.3d 415, 419 (2d Cir. 2006). The Second Circuit then 
remanded the ISP’s First Amendment claims for further consideration in light of the PATRIOT 
Act Reauthorization Act. Id. 
 61. 549 F.3d 861, 881 (2d Cir. 2008), as modified (Mar. 26, 2009).  
 62. See id. at 879–80 (citing Freedman v. State of Md., 380 U.S. 51 (1965)). 
 63. Id. at 882. The Court stated that allowing the certification to be conclusive would 
“reduce strict scrutiny to no scrutiny.” Id. 
 64. Id. at 885. 
 65. 930 F. Supp. 2d 1064 (N.D. Cal. 2013). The Wall Street Journal has reported that the 
unnamed ISP is likely a subsidiary of Working Assets Inc. named CREDO Mobile. Jennifer 
Valentino-DeVries, Covert FBI Power to Obtain Phone Data Faces Rare Test, WALL ST. J. 
(July 18, 2012), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303567704577519213 
906388708, available at http://perma.cc/CZP6-8QHN. 
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the Northern District of California granted the petition and declared 
that the nondisclosure provisions of the NSL statutes are not 
sufficiently narrowly tailored to serve compelling governmental 
interests in national security without unduly burdening speech 
protected by the First Amendment.
66
 This court also agreed with the 
Mukasey decision and found that the provisions of NSL statutes 
which mandate the standard of review and level of deference applied 
to the government certifications were violative of the First 
Amendment and separation of powers principles.
67
 The court also 
ruled that the nondisclosure portion of the statute was not severable 
in that NSLs could not achieve their function without the 
nondisclosure order, and therefore the entire statute, including the 
underlying power to obtain customer records, is unenforceable.
68
 The 
government appealed.
69
 Since this ruling declaring the NSL statutes 
illegal, Google has tried and failed at least twice to avoid complying 
with them.
70
 
 
 66. In Re National Security Letter, 930 F. Supp. 2d at 1075. Specifically, the court 
concluded that the nondisclosure provision of 18 U.S.C. § 2709(c) violates the First 
Amendment and 18 U.S.C. § 3511(b)(2) and (b)(3) violate the First Amendment and separation 
of powers principles. Id. at 1081. 
 67. The court found that the “NSL nondisclosure provisions are not narrowly tailored on 
their face, since they apply, without distinction, to both the content of the NSLs and to the very 
fact of having received one.” Id. The court also found that, “as written, the statute 
impermissibly attempts to circumscribe a court’s ability to review the necessity of 
nondisclosure orders.” Id. at 1077. 
 68. The court stated, “[t]he statutory provisions at issue—as written, adopted and 
amended by Congress in the face of a constitutional challenge—are not susceptible to 
narrowing or conforming constructions to save their constitutionality.” Id. at 1080. The 
government would therefore have been enjoined from issuing NSLs under § 2709 or from 
enforcing the nondisclosure provision in this or any other case, however the court’s judgment 
was stayed pending appeal. Id. at 1081. 
 69. Notice of Appeal In re Nat’l Sec. Letter, (N.D. Cal. 2013) (No. C 11-2173 SI), 
available at https://www.eff.org/files/filenode/noticeofappeal.pdf, also available at https://perma. 
cc/N7YC-D4HP. 
 70. Although the cases are seemingly under seal, it appears Google has twice refused to 
cooperate with NSLs following In Re National Security Letter. Karen Gullo, Google Fights 
U.S. National Security Probe Data Demand, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 3, 2013), http://www. 
bloomberg.com/news/2013-04-04/google-fights-u-s-national-security-probe-data-demand.html 
[hereinafter Gullo, Google Fights NSL Demand] (regarding N.D. Cal. suit), available at 
http://perma.cc/QD86-AU2Y; Declan McCullagh, Judge orders Google to comply with FBI’s 
secret NSL demands, CNET (May 31, 2013), http://www.cnet.com/news/judge-orders-google-
to-comply-with-fbis-secret-nsl-demands/ [hereinafter McCullagh, Judge orders Google] 
(regarding N.D. Cal. suit), available at http://perma.cc/Y8NK-W5LC; Declan McCullagh, 
Justice Department tries to force Google to hand over user data, CNET (May 31, 2013), http:// 
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Challenges have also been mounted against other statutes 
purporting to allow the government to collect electronic 
communications information without a warrant. Klayman v. Obama
71
 
and ACLU v. Clapper
72
 concern the warrantless collection of so-
called “metadata”73 pursuant to 50 U.S.C.A. § 1861, otherwise 
known as Section 215 of the PATRIOT Act.
74
 Section 215 permits 
the government to obtain metadata records related to foreign 
 
www.cnet.com/news/justice-department-tries-to-force-google-to-hand-over-user-data/ [hereinafter 
McCullagh, Justice Department] (regarding S.D.N.Y. suit), available at http://perma.cc/NJX6-
82UM. According to press accounts, the DOJ has filed “petitions to enforce” to compel Google 
to cooperate with the NSLs—once before the same judge who decided In Re National Security 
Letter in the Northern District of California, and once in the Southern District of New York. 
Gullo, Google Fights NSL Demand, supra. Press accounts indicate that the Northern District of 
California judge rejected Google’s request to modify or throw out nineteen NSLs at issue 
because Google had raised arguments broadly against NSLs, not related specifically to the 
nineteen before the Court. McCullagh, Judge orders Google, supra Additionally the judge did 
not want to “interfere while the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals is reviewing the 
constitutionality of NSLs in an unrelated case that she also oversaw.” Id. The unrelated case 
was presumably In Re National Security Letter itself. In yet another case brought by a different 
petitioner before the same judge, the Court stated that because NSLs are “under review at the 
Ninth Circuit,” and because the subsequent petitioner “did not raise arguments specific to the 
two NSLs at issue,” their petition to modify or set aside two NSLs was denied. Order Denying 
Petition to Set Aside and Granting Cross-Petition to Enforce In re Matter of Nat’l Sec. Letters, 
No. C 13-1165 SI (N.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2013) No. C 13-1165 SI, available at https://www. 
eff.org/files/2014/01/16/008_-redacted_order_enforcing_nsls_1165.pdf, also available at 
https://perma.cc/4BHG-XAQH. The judge in the Southern District of New York had not made 
a final ruling as of May 31, 2013. McCullagh, Justice Department, supra. Although the case is 
under seal, according to press accounts, the California case is In Re Google Inc.’s Petition to Set 
Aside Legal Process (No. 13-80063) (N.D. Cal 2013); Gullo, Google Fights NSL Demand, 
supra. 
 71. No. 13-0881 (RJL), 2013 WL 6598728 (D.D.C. Dec. 16, 2013). 
 72. 959 F. Supp. 2d 724 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
 73. Metadata are “information about information.” Paul M. Schwartz, Property, Privacy, 
and Personal Data, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2055, 2070 (2004). For example, metadata generated in 
a Microsoft Word document “can include the author’s name and initials; the names of previous 
document authors; the name of the author’s company or organization; the name of one’s 
computer; the name of the network server or hard disk where the document was saved; 
document revisions; hidden text or cells; and personalized editing comments. Id. 
 74. 50 U.S.C. § 1861 (2009). Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act, which amended 
FISA 50 U.S.C.A. § 1861, is one of the most frequently discussed tools for requesting data 
other than NSLs. Section 215 “allows the government to file an application with the FISC for 
an order compelling production of business records or other tangible things.” Kris & Wilson, 
supra note 6, § 20:8. Some of the so-called “tangible things” in question are in fact records 
similar to those obtainable through an NSL. See Kris & Wilson, supra note 6, § 19:1. Another 
widely discussed tool for acquiring data is Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act, codified 
at 50 U.S.C.A. §§ 1881a, which allows the targeting on non-U.S. persons reasonably believed 
to be outside the US. Id. § 17:3. 
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intelligence through an ex parte appearance before the FISC.
75
 Bulk 
collection under Section 215 is premised upon the third party doctrine 
described in Smith v. Maryland.
76
 
In a marked shift, the District Court for the District of Columbia 
in Klayman v. Obama found that Smith v. Maryland and the third 
party doctrine were not controlling and therefore did not extinguish 
the expectation of privacy a person has when using a telephone 
company or ISP.
77
 Accordingly, the court held that Section 215 is 
likely unconstitutional.
78
 The court based its decision on United 
States v. Jones, the vastly altered technological landscape since the 
Supreme Court handed down Smith, and the scale of the mass 
surveillance presented by the case.
79
  
In contrast, ACLU v. Clapper, handed down by the District Court 
for the Southern District of New York just days after Klayman v. 
Obama, raised the same question regarding the constitutionality of 
mass metadata collection under Section 215 and came to the opposite 
decision.
80
 The court found that Smith and the third party doctrine are 
controlling and bar an attack on Section 215 based on the reasonable 
expectation of privacy.
81
 A District Court in the District of Ohio held 
similarly in Smith v. Obama.
82
 
 
 75. 50 U.S.C. § 1861 (2009). 
 76. See In re F.B.I. for an Order Requiring Prod. of Tangible Things from Redacted, No. 
BR 13-109, 2013 WL 5741573, at *2 (Foreign Intel. Surv. Ct. Aug. 29, 2013) (holding in a case 
challenging Section 215 that “[t]he production of telephone service provider metadata is 
squarely controlled by the Court’s decision in Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 99 S. Ct. 2577, 
61 L.Ed. 2d 220 (1979)”). 
 77. No. 13-0881 (RJL), 2013 WL 6598728 at *17-22 (D.D.C. Dec. 16, 2013); see Laura 
K. Donohue, Fisa Reform, 10 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 599, 639 n.45 (2014) 
(comparing the holding in ACLU v. Clapper which found that Smith controls with the holding 
in Klayman, which found Smith does not control). 
 78. Klayman, 2013 WL 6598728 at *17-22. 
 79. The Court stated, “Like the concurring justices in Jones, I cannot ‘identify with 
precision the point at which’ bulk metadata collection becomes a search, but there is a 
substantial likelihood that the line was crossed under the circumstances presented in this case.” 
Id. at *20 n.48. It added, “the Smith pen register and the ongoing NSA Bulk Telephony 
Metadata Program have so many significant distinctions between them that I cannot possibly 
navigate these uncharted Fourth Amendment waters using as my North Star a case that predates 
the rise of cell phones.” Id. at *22. 
 80. 959 F. Supp. 2d 724 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
 81. See id. at 751; see also Donohue, supra note 77. 
 82. No. 2:13-CV-257-BLW, 2014 WL 2506421 (D. Idaho June 3, 2014). 
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Crucially, the NSL statutes rely upon the same exception to the 
Fourth Amendment as bulk collection under Section 215: the third 
party doctrine established by Smith.
83
 If the third party doctrine is 
overturned or ruled inapplicable to Section 215, it should be 
overturned or ruled inapplicable to the even more relaxed standards 
of NSLs. Should both opinions be affirmed on appeal (or should they 
both be reversed), the issue will be ripe for Supreme Court review.
84
 
II. DISCLOSURE OF AGGREGATE STATISTICS OF ISSUED NSLS 
Customers of businesses that collect user data and records expect 
that data to be kept private unless permission is granted for the data 
to be shared, or unless the government has proper legal authority to 
obtain them. The secrecy of NSLs undermines that trust because 
customers do not know how frequently a business passes its data or 
records on to the government. This problem is particularly acute for 
companies with business models that emphasize the security of 
housing data in the cloud—storage on dispersed, third party servers 
rather than the customers’ own servers. 
Even prior to the disclosures in June of 2013 by NSA contractor 
Edward Snowden revealing the extent of US governmental 
surveillance,
85
 several American technology companies began to 
issue “transparency reports” to allow the public to discern how 
frequently the government requests and gains access to private data 
through search warrants and court subpoenas.
86
 In March of 2013, 
Google, with the government’s permission, began to publish broad 
ranges of figures describing the number of NSLs it has received 
 
 83. See supra note 76; see also Klayman, 2013 WL 6598728 at *17-22; Smith 2014 WL 
2506421 at *1007. 
 84. One news article following the conflicting opinions stated, “Pauley’s ruling contrasted 
with one issued Dec. 16 by Judge Richard Leon for the District Court for the District of 
Columbia, thus increasing the possibility that the United States Supreme Court will have to 
settle the matter.” Joel Stashenko, Federal Judge Backs Collection of Phone Data, N.Y.L.J. 
(Dec. 30, 2013), http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/id=1388149352034?slreturn=2014010 
6025319, available at http://perma.cc/A89S-46UD.  
 85. See supra note 1. 
 86. See Kashmir Hill, Thanks, Snowden! Now All The Major Tech Companies Reveal 
How Often They Give Data To Government, FORBES (Nov. 14, 2013), http://www.forbes. com/ 
sites/kashmirhill/2013/11/14/silicon-valley-data-handover-infographic/, available at http://perma. 
cc/5MWT-6XX4. 
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annually.
87
 Following Edward Snowden’s disclosures, many more 
companies sought to make clear that their cooperation with the 
government is compulsory, and that requests for information are not 
frequent or routine.
88
 
AOL, Apple, Facebook, Google, LinkedIn, Microsoft, and Yahoo 
recently signed an open letter in support of a bill entitled the USA 
Freedom Act.
89
 The letter focuses primarily on the issue of 
transparency, namely, allowing these companies to disclose more 
information about what data the government has requested of them.
90
 
The Act aims to rein in dragnet collection of data,
91
 increase 
transparency of the FISC, provide companies the ability to release 
information regarding FISA requests, and create an independent 
constitutional advocate to argue cases before the FISC.
92
 The bill 
would also require unclassified reports on NSLs, including 
“aggregate number of requests relating to US persons, non-US 
persons, persons subject to national security investigation, persons 
 
 87. In March of 2013, Google began to report NSL statistics, stating, 
Starting today, we’re now including data about NSLs in our Transparency Report. 
We’re thankful to U.S. government officials for working with us to provide greater 
insight into the use of NSLs. Visit our page on user data requests in the U.S. and you’ll 
see, in broad strokes, how many NSLs for user data Google receives, as well as the 
number of accounts in question. 
Transparency Report: Shedding more light on National Security Letters, GOOGLE (Mar. 5, 
2013), http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2013/03/transparency-report-shedding-more-light.html, 
available at http://perma.cc/AE7Z-UYUM.  
 88. Hill, supra note 86. 
 89. USA FREEDOM Act, H.R. 3361, S. 1599, 113th Cong. § 1 (2013); Letter from AOL, 
Apple, Facebook, Google, LinkedIn, Microsoft, and Yahoo, to Patrick Leahy, Chairman, 
Committee on the Judiciary, et al. (Oct. 31, 2013), (http://sensenbrenner.house.gov/ 
uploadedfiles/usa_freedom_act_letter.pdf, available at http://perma.cc/8KQ7-BTMH). 
 90. Dieter Bohn, Apple, Microsoft, Google, and others urge Congress to enact NSA 
reforms, THE VERGE (Oct. 31, 2013), http://www.theverge.com/2013/10/31/5053438/apple-
microsoft-google-and-others-urge-congress-to-enact-nsa-reforms/in/4483763, available at 
http://perma.cc/9YGC-AR6C. 
 91. See, e.g., Berger v. State of New York, 388 U.S. 41, 65 (1967) (Douglas, J., 
concurring) (explaining that dragnet electronic surveillance “sweep[s] in all conversations 
within its scope—without regard to the participants or the nature of the conversations. It 
intrudes upon the privacy of those not even suspected of crime and intercepts the most intimate 
of conversations.”). 
 92. The USA FREEDOM Act, JIM SENSENBRENNER’S CONG. WEBSITE 
http://sensenbrenner.house.gov/legislation/theusafreedomact.htm (last visited Feb. 6, 2014), 
available at http://perma.cc/SYD7-XQQV. 
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linked to a subject of a national security investigation, and persons 
not subject to an investigation or linked to a subject of an 
investigation.”93 Although the bill failed in the Senate on November 
18, 2014, in a 58–42 vote, Senator Patrick Leahy has committed to 
continue working towards its passage.
94
 
On June 11, 2013, Google asked the Attorney General and FBI for 
permission to publish more explicitly the number and scope of secret 
subpoenas, including NSLs and FISA requests.
95
 When the 
government refused to allow such disclosures, Google filed a motion 
seeking a declaratory judgment of its right to publish aggregate 
information about the subpoenas, such as the total number of requests 
for data received and users of accounts encompassed within such 
requests.
96
 Shortly thereafter Microsoft filed a similar motion.
97
 
Yahoo, Facebook, and LinkedIn filed motions seeking the same 
declaratory judgment in September.
98
 Moreover, Apple stated that it 
 
 93. Alan Butler, Standing Up to Clapper: How to Increase Transparency and Oversight 
of Fisa Surveillance, 48 NEW ENG. L. REV. 55, 95 (2013) (citing USA FREEDOM Act, supra 
note 89). 
 94. Bill Chappell, Bill Limiting NSA Surveillance Practices Fails In Senate, NPR (Nov. 
18, 2014), http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2014/11/18/365073310/bill-limiting-nsa-
surveillance-practices-fails-in-senate, available at http://perma.cc/BB7R-7Y2Z. 
 95. Google’s blog post stated, 
We therefore ask you to help make it possible for Google to publish in our 
Transparency Report aggregate numbers of national security requests, including FISA 
disclosures—in terms of both the number we receive and their scope. Google’s 
numbers would clearly show that our compliance with these requests falls far short of 
the claims being made. Google has nothing to hide. 
Asking the U.S. Government to Allow Google to Publish More National Security Request Data, 
GOOGLE (June 11, 2013), http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2013/06/asking-us-government-to-
allow-google-to.html, available at http://perma.cc/QS8G-WAT6.  
 96. In re Mot. for Declaratory Judgment of Google Inc.’s First Amendment Right to 
Publish Aggregate Information about FISA Orders (FISA Ct. 2013), available at 
http://www.fisc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/Misc%2013-03%20Motion-10.pdf. 
 97. In re Mot. for Declaratory Judgment of Microsoft Inc.’s First Amendment Right to 
Publish Aggregate Information about FISA Orders (FISA Ct. 2013), available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/courts/fisc/misc-13-04-motion.pdf.  
 98. In re Mot. to Disclose Aggregate Data Regarding FISA Orders (FISA Ct. 2013), 
available at http://www.fisc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/Misc%2013-05%20Motion-12.pdf; 
In re Mot. for Declaratory Judgment to Disclose Aggregate Data Regarding FISA Orders and 
Directives (FISA Ct. 2013), available at http://www.fisc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/ 
Misc%2013-06%20Motion-3.pdf; In re Mot. for Declaratory Judgment that LinkedIn 
Corporation May Report Aggregate Data Regarding FISA Orders (FISA Ct. 2013), available at 
http://www.fisc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/Misc%2013-07%20Motion-3.pdf. 
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would file an amicus brief with the Ninth Circuit in support of greater 
transparency regarding NSLs.
99
  
On January 17, 2014, President Obama announced reforms to the 
various surveillance activities revealed by Snowden. Among them, 
Obama pledged that with regard to NSLs, 
[S]ecrecy will not be indefinite, so that it will terminate within 
a fixed time unless the government demonstrates a real need 
for further secrecy. We will also enable communications 
providers to make public more information than ever before 
about the orders that they have received to provide data to the 
government.
100
  
 On January 27, 2014, the Obama administration announced that it 
would allow aggregate numbers of secret data requests to be 
disclosed pursuant to Executive Order 13526, § 3.1(c) to settle the 
filed motions and create a new framework for reporting on national 
surveillance requests.
101
 According to a letter written by James M. 
Cole, Deputy Attorney General (DAG Letter), going forward, the 
settling companies and all others may begin reporting the number of 
NSLs (and FISA orders) received in bands of 1,000. Further, each 
company may also report the number of accounts affected 
collectively by the NSLs (and FISA orders), in ranges of 1,000.
102
 
Companies may publish the figures once every six months, with a 
 
 99. Apple stated in its Transparency Report, “later this year, we will file a second Amicus 
brief at the Ninth Circuit in support of a case seeking greater transparency with respect to 
National Security Letters.” Report on Government Information Requests, APPLE (Nov. 5, 2013), 
https://www.apple.com/pr/pdf/131105reportongovinforequests3.pdf, available at https://perma. 
cc/EC7E-MY8N. 
 100. Obama, supra note 37. The announcement coincided with the President’s signing of 
Presidential Policy Directive—28, Signals Intelligence Activities (PPD-28) (Jan. 17, 2015), 
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/01/17/presidential-policy-
directive-signals-intelligence-activities, available at http://perma.cc/98PY-AV5G. 
 101. Gov. Notice, Nos. Misc 13-03, 13-04, 13-05, 13-06, 13-07 (FISA Ct. Jan. 27, 2014), 
available at http://www.fisc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/Misc%2013-03%20Notice.pdf; 
Letter from James M. Cole, Deputy Attorney Gen., to Colin Stretch, Vice President and Gen. 
Counsel, Facebook, et al. (Jan. 27, 2014) (http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/ 
366201412716018407143.pdf, available at http://perma.cc/A7R9-GNG5) [hereinafter DAG 
Letter]; David Kravets, Tech Giants, Telcos Get OK to Release Stats on NSASpying, WIRED 
(Jan. 27, 2014), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2014/01/nsa-public-spying-data/, available 
at http://perma.cc/6LRK-4MYA. 
 102. See DAG Letter, supra note 101. 
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six-month delay in reporting periods.
103
 There is a two-year delay for 
any “new capability”–any new type of service a company offers.104 
Alternatively, a company may report the total number of all “national 
security process” received, including all NSLs and FISA orders (and 
the total number of “customer selectors”—i.e., accounts), reported as 
a single number in bands of 0-249 and thereafter in bands of 250.
105
  
 The exception allowing for perpetual gag orders when “the 
government demonstrates a real need for further secrecy” is a 
loophole that may render the announced changes meaningless.
106
 
Opponents of dragnet government surveillance generally felt that the 
reforms announced by the President did not go far enough.
107
 Twitter, 
for instance, decried the improvements as not meaningful.
108
 
Indeed, in October of 2014, Twitter filed a lawsuit seeking 
declaratory judgment that it has the right to publish a Transparency 
Report that does not follow the framework established in the DAG 
 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. See Meghan Neal, Obama’s Linguistic Loopholes, VICE MOTHERBOARD (Jan. 17, 
2014, 5:30 PM), http://motherboard.vice.com/blog/obamas-linguistic-loopholes (stating that 
“instead of introducing concrete actions to curtail government spying, the president offered up a 
cocktail of ambiguous proposals, explained with carefully chosen vague language riddled with 
qualifiers and escape clauses that leave a lot of wiggle room for the NSA to continue business 
as usual.”), available at http://perma.cc/HZG3-LDZE. 
 107. See, e.g., Neil M. Richards, Obama’s Surveillance Reforms, BOSTON REV. (Jan. 22, 
2014), https://www.bostonreview.net/blog/richards-nsa-obama-surveillance, available at 
https://perma.cc/3JW7-RL2J; Mike Masnick, Feds Reach Settlement With Internet Companies 
Allowing Them To Report Not Nearly Enough Details On Surveillance Efforts, TECHDIRT (Jan. 
27, 2014), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20140127/17253826014/feds-reach-settlement-with-
internet-companies-allowing-them-to-report-not-nearly-enough-details-surveillance-efforts.shtml, 
available at https://perma.cc/HSE9-TRSV; Tony Romm, Obama administration to allow 
Facebook, Google, others more NSA transparency, POLITICO (Jan. 27 2014), http://www. 
politico.com/story/2014/01/barack-obama-administration-nsa-national-security-agency-tech-
technology-transparency-eric-holder-james-clapper-102677.html, available at http://perma.cc/ 
73GP-ZJJ2. 
 108. Twitter explained in a blog post that  
allowing Twitter, or any other similarly situated company, to only disclose national 
security requests within an overly broad range seriously undermines the objective of 
transparency. In addition, we also want the freedom to disclose that we do not receive 
certain types of requests, if, in fact, we have not received any. 
Jeremy Kessel, Fighting for more #transparency, TWITTER BLOG (Feb. 6, 2014), https://blog. 
twitter.com/2014/fighting-for-more-transparency, available at https://perma.cc/X5SG-ETTQ. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol47/iss1/15
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Letter.
109
 Twitter alleged that the government prohibits services like 
Twitter “from providing their own informed perspective as potential 
recipients of various national security-related requests.”110 Twitter 
explained that it submitted a draft Transparency Report to the 
government, but after five months, the government informed Twitter 
that “information contained in the [transparency] report is classified 
and cannot be publicly released” because it does not comply with the 
DAG Letter framework.
111
 The complaint stated that the 
government’s “position forces Twitter either to engage in speech that 
has been preapproved by government officials or else to refrain from 
speaking altogether.”112  
Specifically, Twitter objects to the requirement that the first 
interval that can be reported ranges from 0-249, precluding an 
announcement that Twitter has received zero NSLs.
113
 Twitter’s 
argument mirrors many of the arguments made in In Re National 
Security Letter with a few additions.
114
 Like the plaintiff in that case, 
Twitter claims “The nondisclosure and judicial review provisions of 
18 U.S.C. § 2709(c) are facially unconstitutional under the First 
Amendment.”115 It also claims that 18 U.S.C. § 2709(c) is 
unconstitutional as applied to Twitter.
116
 Like the plaintiffs in In Re 
National Security Letter, Twitter claims that altering of the standard 
of review for NSLs represents a violation of separation of powers 
principles.
117
 Twitter additionally claims that the DAG Letter violates 
the Administrative Procedure Act for a variety of reasons, including 
 
 109. Complaint for Declaratory Judgment 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202, Twitter v. Holder, 
No. 14-CV-4480, 2014 WL 5012514 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 2014); see also Ben Lee, Taking the 
Fight For #transparency to court, TWITTER (Oct. 7, 2014), https://blog.twitter.com/2014/ 
taking-the-fight-for-transparency-to-court, available at https://perma.cc/2CRY-VRBQ.  
 110. Complaint, supra note 109, ¶ 2. 
 111. Id. ¶ 3. 
 112. Id. ¶ 4. The complaint also emphasizes that Twitter cannot be bound by the terms of 
the January 27th notice, which settled other companies’ claims. Id. 
 113. Id. ¶ 5, ¶ 27. Because Twitter is seeking the right to affirmatively state it has received 
zero NSLs rather than the right to cease making a statement saying as much, the case is slightly 
different from litigation that might take place regarding a normal warrant canary (discussed 
below) in that it does not implicate compelled speech. See infra note 125 and accompanying 
text. 
 114. 930 F. Supp. 2d 1064 (N.D. Cal. 2013). See supra note 65 and accompanying text. 
 115. Complaint, supra note 109, ¶ 46. 
 116. Id. ¶ 47. 
 117. Id. ¶ 48. 
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that it “represents a final agency action not in accordance with 
law.”118 
In seeking dismissal, the government has responded that the DAG 
Letter itself does not limit Twitter’s ability to publish its 
Transparency Report.
119
 Instead, “any such restrictions stem from 
other authority, including statutory law such as FISA, applicable 
orders and directives issued through the [FISC], and from any 
applicable nondisclosure agreements.”120 The government explained 
that on “January 27, 2014, the Director of National Intelligence 
declassified certain aggregate data concerning national security legal 
process so that recipients of such process could reveal aggregate 
data,” and the DAG Letter merely defines what may be published 
following this declassification.
121
 The outcome of this case may help 
to clarify not only which statistics companies may disclose in the 
interests of transparency, but whether warrant canaries, discussed 
below, are legal. 
On February 3, 2015, Director of National Intelligence James 
Clapper announced changes to government surveillance policies 
which implement the reforms outlined by President Obama in 
January, 2014.
122
 Among them, 
In response to the President’s new direction, the FBI will now 
presumptively terminate National Security Letter 
nondisclosure orders at the earlier of three years after the 
opening of a fully predicated investigation or the 
investigation’s close. 
 
 118. Id. ¶ 44. 
 119. Defendant’s Notice of Motion and Partial Motion to Dismiss, Twitter v. Holder, No. 
14-CV-4480 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 2014). 
 120. Id. at 2. 
 121. Id. at 7. 
 122. Signals Intelligence Reform, 2015 Anniversary Report, IC ON THE RECORD, (Feb. 3, 
2015), http://icontherecord.tumblr.com/ppd-28/2015/overview, available at http://perma.cc/ 
TD6P-74YX. Specifically, the changes are intended to implement PPD-28. See supra note 100. 
Statement by Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism Lisa 
Monaco: Update on Implementation of Signals Intelligence Reform and Issuance of PPD-28, 
THE WHITE HOUSE, OFFICE OF THE PRESS SEC’RETARY (Feb. 3, 2015), http://www.whitehouse. 
gov/the-press-office/2015/02/03/statement-assistant-president-homeland-security-and-counter 
terrorism-lis, available at http://perma.cc/NQ3B-ZEH4.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol47/iss1/15
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 Continued nondisclosures orders beyond this period are 
permitted only if a Special Agent in Charge or a Deputy 
Assistant Director determines that the statutory standards for 
nondisclosure continue to be satisfied and that the case agent 
has justified, in writing, why continued nondisclosure is 
appropriate.
123
 
In other words, although NSLs statutorily may continue to be issued 
with a perpetual gag order, the FBI will adopt a policy whereby it 
sometimes voluntarily terminates the gag order after three years. 
This change, while an improvement over the previous policy of 
allowing all gag orders to stand in perpetuity, does not implement the 
changes recommended by the President’s Review Group on 
Intelligence and Communications Technologies or dragnet 
surveillance opponents. The new policy “doesn’t address concerns 
that NSL gag orders lack adequate due process protections, lack basic 
judicial oversight, and may violate the First Amendment.”124 
III. COUNTERMEASURES TO NSLS AND LEGAL PRECEDENT 
Some companies have expressed an interest in going beyond 
disclosing the number of NSLs received by either actively fighting 
the gag order associated with an NSL, or adjusting policies so that 
cooperation with an NSL is impossible or useless to the government.  
 
 123. Signals Intelligence Reform, 2015 Anniversary Report: Strengthening Privacy & Civil 
Liberties Protections, IC ON THE RECORD (Feb. 3, 2015), http://icontherecord.tumblr.com/ppd-
28/2015/privacy-civil-liberties#letters, available at http://perma.cc/BE6E-K9WX.  
 124. Megan Graham, The Newest Reforms on SIGINT Collection Still Leave Loopholes, 
JUST SECURITY (Feb. 3 2015), http://justsecurity.org/19665/newest-reforms-sigint-collection-
leave-plenty-loopholes/, available at http://perma.cc/EF5C-7M3U; see also Cyrus Farivar, 
Experts decry “nibbling at the edges” rather than real surveillance reform, ARS TECHNICA 
(Feb. 3 2015), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2015/02/experts-decry-nibbling-at-the-edges-
rather-than-real-surveillance-reform/ (quoting Mark Rumold, a staff attorney with the EFF, who 
stated “[i]t’s still an unconstitutional gag, and they just changed it from an indefinite 
unconstitutional gag to a three-year unconstitutional gag.”), available at http://perma.cc/7MDT-
F3FR. 
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A. The Warrant Canary and Coerced Speech 
One proposed countermeasure is the warrant canary, a regularly 
issued statement by an entity asserting that it has not received an NSL 
or secret warrant recently.
125
 If the entity does receive an NSL, it 
would simply stop issuing the statement rather than violate the 
prohibition on disclosing the receipt of the NSL.
126
 Users of the 
service offered by the entity would be instructed to watch for 
continued issuance of the statement.
127
 When a user of the service 
notices the absence of the statement, that user would assume that the 
entity has in fact received an NSL.
128
 Because it is the failure to take 
action rather than actual action that triggers the alert, this 
countermeasure acts as a dead-man’s-switch.129 If the FBI wanted to 
avoid alerting the service’s users to the fact that an NSL has been 
 
 125. For additional, recent analyses of warrant canaries, see Rebecca Wexler, Note, 
Warrant Canaries and Disclosure by Design: The Real Threat to National Security Letter Gag 
Orders, 124 YALE L.J. FORUM 158 (2014) and Naomi Gilens, The NSA Has Not Been Here: 
Warrant Canaries as Tools for Transparency in the Wake of the Snowden Disclosures (Apr. 
2014) (unpublished Note, Harvard Law School) available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2498150, 
also available at http://perma.cc/P45G-5Y3J.  
 126. The “warrant canary” may have been first proposed by Steven Schear on the 
cypherpunks mailing list in 2002 at https://groups.yahoo.com/neo/groups/cypherpunks-lne-
archive/conversations/topics/5869, available at https://perma.cc/9U5Y-ERFS. The below image 
(and several more available at http://www.librarian.net/technicality.html, also available at 
http://perma.cc/SA5H-6FTP) represents a physical incarnation of a warrant canary created by 
Jessamyn West in 2002 to be used in libraries: 
 
 127. See Kurt Opsahl, Warrant Canary Frequently Asked Questions, ELEC. FRONTIER 
FOUND. (Apr. 10, 2014), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/04/warrant-canary-faq, available 
at http://perma.cc/MM8R-6TVT. 
 128. See id. 
 129. Cory Doctorow, How to foil NSA sabotage: use a dead man’s switch, THE GUARDIAN, 
(Sept. 9, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2013/sep/09/nsa-sabotage-dead-mans-
switch, available at http://perma.cc/39UY-ZR8A. 
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issued, it would have to coerce the entity to continue issuing the 
statement against its will.
130
 However, alerting a user targeted by an 
NSL that one has been received is not the primary purpose of a 
warrant canary.
131
 Instead, a warrant canary helps expose how often 
the government uses NSLs—exceptional legal tools—so the public 
can have an informed debate about whether they are being abused (or 
should continue to exist). Without these disclosures there can be no 
public debate.
132
 
Online storage and backup host rsync.net (rsync) has publicly 
issued a warrant canary since roughly 2005.
133
 Rsync’s warrant 
canary currently reads, “[n]o warrants have ever been served to 
rsync.net, or rsync.net principals or employees. No searches or 
seizures of any kind have ever been performed on rsync.net 
assets.”134 If rsync receives a (traditional) warrant, the text would be 
updated to describe the warrant.
135
 If, however, it receives an NSL or 
other secret request, the warrant canary would cease to be updated or 
issued entirely.
136
 Similarly, Lookout, a mobile security company, 
began publishing a warrant canary in its September 2013 
 
 130. See Gilens, supra note 125, at 7 (stating “[u]ltimately, no matter how informative the 
canary is in theory, it is of no practical use if the government can compel a company to publish 
its canary untruthfully after serving the company with a surveillance request that should kill 
it.”). 
 131. See About Canary Watch, CANARYWATCH.ORG, https://canarywatch.org/about.html, 
available at https://perma.cc/EXL8-A7QE (explaining the intent of a warrant canary “is not to 
harm the judicial process, but rather to engage in a public conversation about the extent of 
government investigatory powers.”). 
 132. See id. at 4 (stating, “[t]here are three primary purposes for which a company may 
adopt a canary. What I term ‘performative canaries’ are exercises in public relations meant to 
show that a company cares about user privacy; ‘granular canaries’ provide useful notification to 
individual users when the security of their personal data is compromised; and ‘public policy 
canaries’ speak to how the government is interpreting and using its surveillance powers 
broadly.”). Most companies are unlikely to implement a warrant canary with the sole purpose of 
alerting a single target to the receipt of an NSL. See id. at 6 (explaining “no company has yet 
taken the concept so far—nor is any company likely to—as doing so would jeopardize 
legitimate investigations into individuals who pose actual threats.”). 
 133. “We have been publishing our Warrant Canary weekly at rsync.net for almost five 
years now.” John Kozubik, The Warrant Canary in 2010 and Beyond, JOHN KOZUBIK’S BLOG 
(Aug. 06, 2010), http://blog.kozubik.com/john_kozubik/2010/08/the-warrant-canary-in-2010-
and-beyond.html, available at http://perma.cc/83UK-T4TV. 
 134. rsync.net Warrant Canary, RSYNC.NET (Feb. 22, 2015), www.rsync.net/resources/ 
notices/canary.txt, available at http://perma.cc/4XML-FXXV. 
 135. Kozubik, supra note 133. 
 136. Id. 
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transparency report, stating “as of the date of this report, Lookout has 
not received a national security order and we have not been required 
by a FISA court to keep any secrets that are not in this transparency 
report.”137 In January of 2015, reddit posted a transparency report 
covering all of 2014.
138
 It contained a warrant canary stating “[a]s of 
January 29, 2015, reddit has never received a National Security 
Letter, an order under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, or 
any other classified request for user information. If we ever receive 
such a request, we would seek to let the public know it existed.”139 
At the end of January a coalition of organizations including the 
EFF, the Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard 
University, New York University’s Technology Law & Policy Clinic, 
and the Calyx Institute created canarywatch.org, which “tracks and 
documents” warrant canaries and “tracks changes or disappearances 
of canaries.”140 The website encourages individuals to submit known 
warrant canaries, and it will thereby become a one-stop-shop for the 
monitoring of warrant canaries.
141
 Additionally, it educates 
individuals and those interested in implementing a warrant canary 
regarding their purpose as well as their basic legal underpinnings.
142
 
Apple was the most prominent example of a company using a 
warrant canary.
143
 In Apple’s November 5, 2013 transparency report, 
 
 137. 2013 Transparency Report, LOOKOUT, https://www.lookout.com/transparency/report-
2013 (last visited Feb. 22, 2015), available at https://perma.cc/RC5Q-UMUT.  
 138. reddit transparency report, 2014, REDDIT (Jan. 29, 2015), https://www.reddit.com/ 
wiki/transparency/2014, available at https://perma.cc/FY6Q-XSVJ. 
 139. Id. Reddit’s transparency report also stated “reddit supports reform of government 
surveillance programs and joined 86 other groups by signing an open letter to Congress in 
2013.” Id. 
 140. See About Canary Watch, supra note 131. 
 141. Id. At the time of publication, canarywatch.org listed twenty-one organizations 
publishing a warrant canary. Canary Watch, CANARYWATCH.ORG, https://canarywatch.org, 
available at https://perma.cc/CGX8-LAT9. 
 142. Frequently Asked Questions, CANARYWATCH.ORG, https://canarywatch.org/faq.html, 
available at https://perma.cc/X6BN-77LB. 
 143. By publishing its warrant canary, Apple became  
one of the first big-name tech companies to use a novel legal tactic to indicate whether 
the government has requested user information in conjunction with a gag order. 
Known as a ‘warrant canary, this language is encapsulated on Apple’s fifth page of its 
new transparency report, which was published on Tuesday. 
Cyrus Farivar, Apple Takes Strong Privacy Stance in New Report, Publishes Rare “Warrant 
Canary”, ARS TECHNICA (Nov. 2013), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/11/apple-takes-
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol47/iss1/15
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the company stated for the first time, “Apple has never received an 
order under Section 215 of the USA Patriot Act. We would expect to 
challenge such an order if served on us.”144 Although Apple’s 
statement pertained to Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act, a 
different but equally contentious section of the law regarding secret 
data requests, the principle remains the same, and the language could 
easily be adjusted to refer to NSLs. Further, some have speculated 
that by excluding language related to NSLs or other provisions of 
FISA from this statement, Apple was indicating that it had in fact 
received such requests.
145
  
Apple and rsync differed in that rsync publishes its warrant canary 
weekly while Apple’s, like most companies’, was published only in 
its transparency reports.
146
 Such reports were issued only every six 
months and contained data that lagged by several months. For 
example, Apple’s November, 2013 transparency report contained 
data from between January 1 to June 30 of 2013.
147
 As discussed 
below, Apple ceased publication of its warrant canary at the end of 
2014.
148
 
Although the warrant canary has never been tested in court, 
several prior cases provide helpful guidance in determining its 
legality. In order to defeat a warrant canary, the government must 
force the NSL recipient to continue to publish a lie—that the 
 
strong-privacy-stance-in-new-report-publishes-rare-warrant-canary/, available at http://perma.cc/ 
8HUS-6YET. 
 144. Report on Government Information Requests, supra note 99. 
 145. One article speculated, 
Apple might have also managed to inform customers that it’s been served with a 
subpoena for customer data, with attendant gag order, under Section 702 of the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) Amendments Act, all without breaking 
the law, moving its lips or saying a word about FISA. The fact that it didn’t mention 
FISA could mean that it has been served, given that it did mention the subpoenas it 
hasn’t received. 
Lisa Vaas, Apple Publishes New Transparency Report. Is There A ‘Warrant Canary’ Nesting 
Inside?, NAKED SEC. (Nov. 7, 2013), http://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2013/11/07/apple-publishes 
-new-transparency-report-is-there-a-warrant-canary-nesting-inside/, available at http://perma. 
cc/G8MT-EANQ. 
 146. April Glaser, Apple Issues First Transparency Report, Includes "Warrant Canary", 
ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Nov. 7, 2013), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/ 11/apples-first-
transparency-report-gets-warrant-canaries-right, available at https://perma.cc/5KGF-UP54. 
 147. Report on Government Information Requests, supra note 99. 
 148. See infra note 165 and accompanying text. 
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recipient has never received an NSL. Cases where the government 
has forced someone to speak—coerced speech—are therefore 
relevant. 
In West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,
149
 the 
Supreme Court stated that “to sustain [a statute requiring students to 
salute a flag] we are required to say that a Bill of Rights which guards 
the individual’s right to speak his own mind, left it open to public 
authorities to compel him to utter what is not in his mind.”150 
In Wooley v. Maynard,
151
 the next major case concerning 
compelled speech, the Supreme Court stated that “the right of 
freedom of thought protected by the First Amendment against state 
action includes both the right to speak freely and the right to refrain 
from speaking at all.”152 The Court, however, left open the possibility 
that a message could be coerced if the state’s countervailing interest 
were sufficiently compelling.
153
  
In Riley v. National Federation of the Blind of North Carolina, 
Inc.,
154
 the Court stated that the difference between compelled speech 
and compelled silence “is without constitutional significance, for the 
First Amendment guarantees ‘freedom of speech,’ a term necessarily 
comprising the decision of both what to say and what not to say.”155  
Applied to NSLs, as the Court in Mukasey recognized, the 
restriction on speech must be narrowly tailored to promote a 
compelling government interest, and there must be no “less restrictive 
alternatives that would be at least as effective in achieving the 
legitimate purpose that the statute was enacted to serve.”156 Because 
“it is obvious and unarguable that no governmental interest is more 
compelling than the security of the Nation, the principal strict 
 
 149. 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
 150. Id. at 634. 
 151. 430 U.S. 705 (1977); Larry Alexander, Compelled Speech, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 
147, 151 (2006). Unlike Barnette, which required an affirmative duty to act on behalf of the 
students (saluting the flag), Wooley concerned a negative duty not to obscure any part of a 
license plate. Alexander, supra. However, the Court found that the negative duty not to obscure 
the license plate was itself entangled in the affirmative duty to display a license plate. Id. 
 152. Maynard, 430 U.S. at 714. 
 153. See id. at 717. 
 154. 487 U.S. 781 (1988). 
 155. Id. at 782 (1988). 
 156. John Doe, Inc. v. Mukasey, 549 F.3d at 878. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol47/iss1/15
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2015]  Legal Responses & Countermeasures 245 
 
 
scrutiny issue turns on whether the narrow tailoring requirement is 
met.”157  
Therefore, given the relevant case history, the only substantive 
difference between an analysis of the constitutionality of the gag 
order and the constitutionality of a warrant canary hinges on whether 
a prohibition on the use of a warrant canary is narrowly tailored to 
promote the government’s national security interest. 
The court in Doe v. Gonzales specified how an analysis of narrow 
tailoring in the context of NSLs should proceed.
158
 Based on 
Freedman v. Maryland,
159
 three safeguards must be in place: 
(1) any restraint in advance of judicial review may be imposed 
only for “a specified brief period,” (2) any further restraint 
prior to “a final judicial determination on the merits” must be 
limited to “the shortest fixed period compatible with sound 
judicial resolution,” and (3) the burden of going to court to 
suppress the speech and the burden of proof once in court must 
rest on the censoring government.
160
 
In Gonzales, the court found the first two elements were satisfied by 
the NSL statutes, but the third was not.
161
 To satisfy this third prong, 
the court stated that the “government must either affirmatively 
terminate the nondisclosure requirement or bear the burden of 
justifying to a court why continued secrecy is necessary within a 
reasonable period of time after the FBI issues an NSL containing a 
nondisclosure order.”162 Mukasey affirmed this portion of the 
opinion,
163
 and a warrant canary would therefore presumably be 
subject to a similar analysis. 
However the DAG Letter dramatically altered the landscape for 
warrant canaries, and the government has implicitly argued that they 
are illegal. The DAG Letter stated “[i]t is the Government’s position 
that the terms outlined in the Deputy Attorney General’s letter define 
 
 157. Id. (quoting Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 307 (1981)). 
 158. Doe v. Gonzales, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 400. 
 159. 380 U.S. 51 (1965). 
 160. Gonzales, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 400. 
 161. Id. at 406. 
 162. Id. at 395. 
 163. Mukasey, 549 F.3d at 881. 
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the limits of permissible reporting for the parties and other similarly 
situated companies.”164 That is, it is the government’s position that 
the DAG Letter defines the reporting methods which all companies 
similar to those that settled must follow. Since the DAG Letter 
prohibits the reporting of zero received NSLs, by implication, it 
prohibits warrant canaries, which usually state a given company has 
never received an NSL. 
This may explain why Apple “killed” its warrant canary in 
September of 2014.
165
 Although some claimed Apple was trying to 
alert readers of its Transparency Report that it had received some sort 
of national security request for data (fulfilling the purpose of a 
warrant canary), it is more likely the company saw the warrant canary 
as incompatible with the DAG Letter. Indeed, the company 
simultaneously explained that it would be reporting the number of 
national security requests using the DAG Letter framework.
166
 
Switching to the framework necessitated “disarming” the warrant 
canary.  
Apple claims it was “pleased” to utilize the new framework.167 
While some companies may see the DAG Letter framework as an 
improvement, others, including Twitter, clearly disagree, as discussed 
above.
168
 However, even under the DAG Letter framework, the 
loophole allowing a prohibition on disclosure within a two-year delay 
for any “new capability” gives the warrant canary continued 
relevancy and makes it particularly important for new and young 
businesses.
169
 Additionally, companies which are not “similarly 
situated” to those that reached a settlement through the DAG Letter 
may continue to see value in a warrant canary. 
 
 164. See DAG Letter, supra note 109. 
 165. Cyrus Farivar, No, Apple probably didn’t get new secret gov’t orders to hand over 
data, ARS TECHNICA (Sept. 18, 2014), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2014/09/no-apple-
probably-didnt-get-new-secret-govt-orders-to-hand-over-data/, available at http://perma.cc/ 
Y6Q9-MBYK. 
 166. Update on National Security and Law Enforcement Orders, APPLE (Jan. 27, 2014) 
https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/1302789-upd-nat-sec-and-law-enf-orders-
20140127.html, available at https://perma.cc/Y3YP-SVC2. 
 167. Id. 
 168. See infra notes 109–18 and accompanying text. 
 169. See Wexler, supra note 125, at 166 (stating “[i]n a constitutionally suspect speaker-
based distinction, younger companies and those who provide new-capability services lack 
permission to disclose at all.). 
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B. Total Anonymization and Tor 
Another proposed tactic for avoiding exposure to NSLs is for 
companies to forego all collection of user data. Under this proposal, 
the company would have no user data to disclose if the FBI, NSA, or 
any other government agency requested data. Several companies 
have adopted this model and use it as their primary selling point.  
DuckDuckGo, an Internet search engine, promises users they can 
“search anonymously,” and that unlike Google and its ilk, it makes 
no attempt to match searches to individuals.
170
 French search engine 
Qwant makes similar claims.
171
 Additionally, several virtual private 
networks (VPNs), services through which a user can mask his or her 
Internet connection through a remote computer, promise to be fully 
anonymous.
172
  
ISPs such as Charter, Comcast, AT&T, and Verizon, are perhaps 
the most important gatekeepers in challenging NSLs and maintaining 
privacy generally. As the company providing the connection between 
the subscriber and the Internet, an ISP is positioned to observe, 
inspect, store, and share with the government every byte of data that 
flows between the user and the Internet.
173
 NSLs and other requests 
 
 170. DuckDuckGo Privacy, DUCKDUCKGO, https://duckduckgo.com/privacy#s3 (last 
visited Feb. 22, 2015) (stating “When you access DuckDuckGo (or any Web site), your Web 
browser automatically sends information about your computer, e.g., your User agent and IP 
address. Because this information could be used to link you to your searches, we do not log 
(store) it at all. This is a very unusual practice, but we feel it is an important step to protect your 
privacy.”), available at https://perma.cc/D62G-7QZQ; see also Charles Arthur, NSA scandal 
delivers record numbers of internet users to DuckDuckGo, THE GUARDIAN (July 10, 2013), 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/10/nsa-duckduckgo-gabriel-weinberg-prism, available 
at http://perma.cc/Q82V-6C98. DuckDuckGo does not use cookies, does not store users’ IP 
addresses, does not have any log-in system, and uses an encrypted connection for user searches 
by default. Id. 
 171. Privacy Statement, QWANT, https://www.qwant.com/privacy (last visited Feb. 22, 
2015) (stating “Qwant’s philosophy is based on 2 pillars: No tracking cookies, No filter bubble. 
We make everything possible to respect your privacy while guaranteeing security and relevant 
results.”), available at https://perma.cc/F66C-6374. 
 172. Which VPN Service Providers Really Take Anonymity Seriously?, TORRENTFREAK 
(Oct. 7, 2011), http://torrentfreak.com/which-vpn-providers-really-take-anonymity-seriously-
111007/ (listing examples including Anonine, IVPN, and Proxy.sh), available at 
http://perma.cc/4Y4A-ZCG7. 
 173. See Paul Ohm, The Rise and Fall of Invasive Isp Surveillance, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 
1417, 1420 (2009) (noting that “[e]verything we say, hear, read, or do on the Internet first 
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issued to ISPs therefore have the potential to unearth a tremendous 
amount of data.
174
 
NSLs are directed to an ISP wile targeting one of that ISP’s users. 
Therefore the only two parties with standing to challenge an NSL are 
the ISP and the individual target. However, the gag order prevents the 
ISP from communicating to the targeted user that he or she has been 
targeted, making the ISP almost always the only entity capable of 
challenging an NSL.
175
 Further, because ISPs are predominantly large 
corporations, regulated by the government and with major business 
and political ties to it, most are unwilling to fight NSLs on behalf of 
their users and do not adopt practices, such as limited data retention, 
which would protect users’ privacy.176  
Some ISPs, such as Sonic.net, XMission, and CREDO Mobile, 
have committed to informing users, when possible, that they have 
been targeted by an NSL, fought NSLs in court, and adopted data 
retention policies that make any compelled response to the 
government far less useful.
177
 Aside from the obvious benefit of 
 
passes through ISP computers. If ISPs wanted, they could store it all, compiling a perfect 
transcript of our online lives.”). 
 174. See Mike Masnick, ISP CEO Explains What Happens When The NSA Shows Up At 
Your Door, TECHDIRT (July 22, 2013), http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20130722/ 
00303923879/isp-ceo-explains-what-happens-when-nsa-shows-up-your-door.shtml, available 
at http://perma.cc/4F4J-DSWH. 
 175. Theories of “hypothetical future harm that is not certainly impending” are too 
speculative, thus eliminating lawsuits by plaintiffs who suspect but cannot conclusively prove 
they are the subject of surveillance. See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1143 
(2013). 
 176. See Neil M. Richards, Intellectual Privacy, 87 TEX. L. REV. 387, 437 (2008). 
Specifically, “when government seeks intellectual information, businesses often have the choice 
whether or not to do so, but will likely do so based upon an internal profit-making calculus 
rather than one which takes into account the interests of their customers in preserving their 
cognitive autonomy.” Id.; see also, Kris & Wilson, supra note 6, at § 20:10 (stating “NSL 
recipients nearly always will be third-party commercial entities, and not the subject of the 
investigation in which the NSL was issued. The recipient therefore will have little incentive to 
assert that the NSL seeks irrelevant information.”). 
 177. Sonic.net has stated that as of 2011, it retains “most IP allocation logs for just two 
weeks.” Dane Jasper, Help us, protect your privacy online, SONIC.NET CEO BLOG (Aug. 1, 
2011, 10:32 AM), http://corp.sonic.net/ceo/2011/08/01/help-us-protect-your-privacy-online/, 
available at http://perma.cc/Y4WX-K736. Additionally, “it is Sonic.net’s policy to notify 
customers upon receipt of a civil subpoena demand of their account information.” Legal 
Process Policy, SONIC.NET, https://wiki.sonic.net/wiki/Legal_Proccess_Policy (last visited Feb. 
22, 2014), available at https://perma.cc/VGU5-3JHR. CREDO states “Unless specifically 
prohibited by court order or statute, CREDO will notify you in writing of the request prior to 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol47/iss1/15
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having an ISP fight NSLs in court, limited data retention policies, 
such as minimizing the amount of time that the IP address assigned to 
each user can be matched to the user’s name, are one of the strongest 
countermeasures to the NSL. An ISP simply cannot fulfill an NSL 
request if the ISP does not possess the information requested, 
allowing the user to remain anonymous.
178
 
Tor (formerly an acronym for The Onion Router) is software 
which uses a series of relays to conceal a user’s location and thereby 
makes his or her Internet traffic anonymous to both ISPs and the 
government.
179
 Because Tor effectively encrypts and anonymizes 
users’ data, US government agencies consider the traffic running 
through the service suspicious and retain it longer than data otherwise 
traversing the Internet.
180
 Tor has been specifically targeted by the 
 
releasing such information.” Privacy and Security Policy, CREDO, MOBILE, http://www.credo 
mobile.com/privacy (last visited Feb. 22, 2015), available at http://perma.cc/6D7K-P9Q9. 
XMission has committed to fighting NSLs as well. Cyrus Farivar, The only Utah ISP (and one 
of the few nationwide) standing up for user privacy, ARS TECHNICA (July 15, 2013), 
http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/07/the-only-utah-isp-and-one-of-the-few-nationwide-
standing-up-for-user-privacy/, available at http://perma.cc/UT4J-9C8B. Google has twice 
challenged NSLs in court following In Re National Security Letter. See supra note 69 and 
accompanying text. 
 178. See supra notes 172–74 and accompanying text. 
 179. See Tor: Overview, THE TOR PROJECT, https://www.torproject.org/about/overview. 
html.en (last visited Feb. 22, 2015), available at https://perma.cc/58NN-43GC. Tor was 
originally sponsored by the US Naval Research Laboratory and continues to receive support 
from the US State Department, the Broadcasting Board of Governors, and the National Science 
Foundation, among others. 60 percent of the Tor Project’s 2 million dollar annual budget came 
from the United States government as of 2012. Annual Report 2012, TOR (2012) https://www. 
torproject.org/about/findoc/2012-TorProject-Annual-Report.pdf. The US government supports 
Tor in part to aid dissidents in countries such as Iran and China that place restrictions on, 
censor, or surveil their citizens’ access to the Internet. See Indira A.R. Lakshmanan, Supporting 
Dissent With Technology, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 23, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/24/ 
us/24iht-letter.html, available at http://perma.cc/3KBE-GR9G. 
 180. Documents leaked by Edward Snowden and published by THE GUARDIAN indicate the 
NSA will retain any encrypted data and “hold it for as long as it takes to crack the data’s 
privacy protections.” Andy Greenberg, Leaked NSA Doc Says It Can Collect And Keep Your 
Encrypted Data As Long As It Takes To Crack It, FORBES (June 20, 2013), http://www. forbes. 
com/sites/andygreenberg/2013/06/20/leaked-nsa-doc-says-it-can-collect-and-keep-your-encrypted-
data-as-long-as-it-takes-to-crack-it/, available at http://perma.cc/J3E6-4WR4; Procedures used by 
NSA to minimize data collection from US persons: Exhibit B – full document, THE GUARDIAN 
(June 20, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/jun/20/exhibit-b-nsa-
procedures-document, available at http://perma.cc/9JFP-S3GW. The document was subsequently 
declassified. See DNI Declassifies Intelligence Community Documents Regarding Collection 
Under Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), IC ON THE RECORD 
(Aug. 21, 2013), http://icontherecord.tumblr.com/post/58944252298/dni-declassifies-intelligence-
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NSA and foreign intelligence services, though apparently with only 
partial success.
181
 Although government agencies have attacked and 
partially compromised Tor in investigations into child pornography 
rings and online black markets, Tor is still considered an effective 
tool in remaining anonymous.
182
 
C. Avoiding the United States’ Jurisdiction 
Under the theory that statutes requiring cooperation with 
government surveillance can only be enforced within US jurisdiction, 
major companies have begun to consider moving to locations that the 
American government cannot reach. Microsoft has announced that it 
will begin offering customers in foreign countries the option of 
having their data stored outside US borders in light of recent 
surveillance revelations.
183
 Microsoft’s general counsel stated, 
“people should have the ability to know whether their data are being 
subjected to the laws and access of governments in some other 
country and should have the ability to make an informed choice of 
where their data resides.”184 Further, Microsoft will “assert available 
jurisdictional objections to legal demands when governments seek 
. . . customer content that is stored in another country.”185  
 
community-documents, available at http://perma.cc/Z3Y4-LR7G. The declassified version is 
now available as well. Minimization Procedures Used by The Nat’l Sec. Agency in Connection 
with Acquisitions of Foreign Intelligence Info. Pursuant to Section 702, as Amended, Eric 
Holder, Attorney General of the United States (Oct. 31, 2011) (http://www.dni.gov/files/ 
documents/Minimization%20Procedures%20used%20by%20NSA%20in%20Connection%20 
with%20FISA%20SECT%20702.pdf). 
 181. James Ball, Bruce Schneier & Glenn Greenwald, NSA and GCHQ target Tor network 
that protects anonymity of web users, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 4, 2013), http://www.theguardian. 
com/world/2013/oct/04/nsa-gchq-attack-tor-network-encryption, available at http://perma.cc/ 
Q4LA-YGU8. 
 182. Cyrus Farivar, FBI halted one child porn inquiry because Tor got in the way, ARS 
TECHNICA (June 12, 2013), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2012/06/fbi-halted-one-child-
porn-inquiry-because-tor-got-in-the-way/, available at http://perma.cc/8L2A-XVHN. 
 183. Bill Rigby, Microsoft lawyer suggests non-U.S. data storage for overseas users: FT, 
REUTERS (Jan. 22, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/01/23/us-usa-security-microsoft-
idUSBREA0M04U20140123, available at http://perma.cc/D33N-AEQA. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Brad Smith, Protecting customer data from government snooping, MICROSOFT 
IMPACT ON SOCIETY BLOG (Dec. 5, 2013), http://www.microsoft.com/eu/impact-on-society/ 
article/protecting-customer-data-from-government-snooping.aspx, available at http://perma.cc/ 
CE9H-C9C7. 
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Indeed, Microsoft has been waging a battle to protect emails 
stored on servers physically located in Ireland from an American 
search warrant.
186
 In July of 2014, a federal judge in the Southern 
District of New York ruled that Microsoft must turn the emails over. 
Microsoft filed a notice of appeal in September 2014.
187
 
Google has considered moving its servers outside the United 
States to avoid national security requests for information.
188
 Although 
it considered the option attractive, Google ultimately decided against 
the move because it would create new technical hurdles and would 
promote the “[b]alkanization of the Internet and the creation of a 
‘splinternet’ broken up into smaller national and regional pieces.”189 
The “splinternet” Google warns of is a system of “parallel Internets 
that would be run as distinct, private, and autonomous universes.”190 
If balkanization were to occur, the very thing that makes the Internet 
so powerful—universal connectivity with all others on the Internet—
would be destroyed. 
Smaller companies and startups without the legacy costs 
associated with existing infrastructure might not be deterred from 
moving servers outside of the United States. Startups seeking funding 
have even begun to pitch their location outside of the United States 
(often in Europe) as a selling point.
191
 Unseen, a private 
communications company, moved its servers and bank account from 
the United States to Iceland because it believes Iceland has superior 
 
 186. In the Matter of a Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled and 
Maintained By Microsoft Corporation, Nos. 13-MAG-2814 (S.D.N.Y. filed Dec. 4, 2013). 
 187. Notice of Appeal, In the Matter of a Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account 
Controlled and Maintained By Microsoft Corporation, Nos. 13-MAG-2814 (S.D.N.Y. filed 
Dec. 4, 2013). 
 188. Cadie Thompson, Google mulled ditching US after NSA scandal, CNBC (Nov. 22, 
2013), http://www.cnbc.com/id/101222237, available at http://perma.cc/H8BY-Q6YJ. 
 189. Id.; Claire Cain Miller, Google Pushes Back Against Data Localization, N.Y. TIMES 
(Jan. 24, 2014), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/01/24/google-pushes-back-against-data-
localization/, available at http://perma.cc/P5VR-SR9J. 
 190. Aparna Kumar, Libertarian, or Just Bizarro?, WIRED (Apr. 24, 2001), 
http://archive.wired.com/politics/law/news/2001/04/43216, available at http://perma.cc/HY2Q-
GJCC. 
 191. Steven Levy, How the NSA Almost Killed the Internet, WIRED (Jan. 7, 2014), 
http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2014/01/how-the-us-almost-killed-the-internet/all/#x, 
available at http://perma.cc/P7HE-EVZN. 
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data privacy laws.
192
 An Australian email provider named FastMail 
emphasizes that it is located in Australia and claims that “even if a 
U.S. court were to serve us with a court order, subpoena or other 
instruction to hand over user data, Australian communications and 
privacy law explicitly forbids us from doing so.”193 Others have 
speculated that Germany or Switzerland could provide a haven for 
companies wishing to keep their data private.
194
 
D. Alternative Networks and Protocols 
Perhaps the most drastic method to avoid exposure to NSLs and 
other surveillance would be to cease use of the Internet and to start 
over with a new network and new protocols built around privacy and 
encryption.
195
 Mesh networks, for instance, are computer networks 
where nodes—individual computers—communicate directly with 
each other through wireless connections.
196
 This avoids the hub-and-
spoke structure whereby connections between computers are 
facilitated by centralized computers, such as those run by ISPs.
197
 
Mesh networks do not need designated routers; instead, nodes serve 
as routers for each other, and this helps eliminate single points at 
 
 192. We’ve Moved to Iceland and Have a New Domain—Unseen.is, UNSEEN.IS BLOG (Oct. 
6, 2013), http://blog.unseen.is/2013/10/06/weve-moved-to-iceland-and-have-a-new-domain-
unseen-is/#awesm=f97470d496e41431728a6d58b34ca183, available at http://perma.cc/Z4Z7-
BD82. 
 193. Rob N., FastMail’s servers are in the US: what this means for you, FASTMAIL 
WEBLOG (Oct. 7, 2013), http://blog.fastmail.fm/2013/10/07/fastmails-servers-are-in-the-us-
what-this-means-for-you/, available at http://perma.cc/YG4E-NAYD. 
 194. Cyrus Farivar, Europe won’t save you: Why e-mail is probably safer in the US, ARS 
TECHNICA (Oct. 13, 2013), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/10/europe-wont-save-you-
why-e-mail-is-probably-safer-in-the-us/2/, available at http://perma.cc/57BW-4TRS; Cyrus 
Farivar, Switzerland won’t save you, either: Why e-mail might still be safer in US, ARS 
TECHNICA (Dec. 22, 2013), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/12/switzerland-wont-save-
you-either-why-e-mail-might-still-be-safer-in-us/, available at http://perma.cc/LNW6-BUT8; 
Germany: Email Providers ‘Seen As Surveillance Safe Haven’, BBC (Aug. 23, 2013), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/blogs-news-from-elsewhere-23851780, available at http://perma.cc/ 
7XLV-ADJS.  
 195. See, e.g., Carlotta Gall & James Glanz, U.S. Promotes Network to Foil Digital Spying, 
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 20, 2014) http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/21/us/us-promotes-network-to-
foil-digital-spying.html, available at http://perma.cc/32SL-J5V9.  
 196. Mesh Networks, P2P FOUNDATION, http://p2pfoundation.net/Mesh_Networks (last 
visited Feb. 22, 2015), available at http://perma.cc/TAR5-XERQ. 
 197. Id. 
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which a government agency could intercept and copy all flowing 
data. Proponents therefore claim that a mesh network, if widely 
adopted, could help stave off surveillance and censorship.
198
 
Networking protocols such as cjdns aim to make encryption and 
privacy a built-in component of such a network.
199
  
The Seattle Meshnet Project provides one example of an attempt 
to create such a network.
200
 The Athens Wireless Metropolitan 
Network is a similar project in Greece, and Guifi.net has comparable 
goals in Spain. Because these networks are in their infancy, the legal 
implications have yet to be considered. 
E. Challenging an NSL 
A company could also challenge an NSL directly. Under 18 
U.S.C.A. § 3511, an NSL may be modified or set aside if 
“compliance would be unreasonable, oppressive, or otherwise 
unlawful.”201 Although the term “unreasonable” is not defined, it has 
been suggested that because the language was borrowed from Federal 
Rules of Criminal Procedure 17, “Congress is unlikely to have 
intended to place the burden on the government to show that the NSL 
seeks relevant and admissible evidence,” and therefore “NSLs 
 
 198. Clive Thompson, How to Keep the NSA Out of Your Computer, MOTHER JONES 
(Sep./Oct. 2013), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2013/08/mesh-internet-privacy-nsa-isp, 
available at http://perma.cc/PC52-CTSL. 
 199. Hal Hodson, Meshnet Activists Rebuilding The Internet From Scratch, NEW 
SCIENTIST (Aug. 8, 2013), http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg21929294.500-meshnet-
activists-rebuilding-the-internet-from-scratch.html, available at http://perma.cc/27FN-P3HU. 
Mesh networks which do not incorporate privacy and encryption into their protocols, such as 
cdjns, may be no more secure than the Internet. See Ed Felten, Mesh Networks Won’t Fix 
Internet Security, FREEDOM TO TINKER (Apr. 22, 2014) https://freedom-to-tinker.com/blog/ 
felten/mesh-networks-wont-fix-internet-security/ (arguing that the mesh networking model does 
not inherently protect users from surveillance), available at https://perma.cc/2RX2-GJLP. 
 200. What is the Seattle Meshnet Project?, SEATTLEMESH.NET http://www.seattlemesh. 
net/about (last visited Feb. 22, 2015), available at http://perma.cc/TRJ3-5H9S. The project aims 
to combine wireless mesh networking and cjdns to create a “decentralized, encrypted . . . 
routing protocol” which “will be resistant towards attempts to censor or otherwise impede free 
and legal speech, while also being resistant to natural disasters and other events that might take 
down ISPs today.” Id. 
 201. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3511(a). 
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probably will be presumed to be reasonable unless they appear 
plainly unreasonable or unduly burdensome.”202 
A company could also attempt to show that the government 
official’s certification that the information is not sought for “an 
authorized investigation against international terrorism or clandestine 
intelligence activities” is incorrect.203 Similarly, a challenger could 
assert that the investigation is based solely on activities protected by 
the First Amendment.
204
 
Finally, a company could attempt to show that the information 
requested in the NSL simply may not be disclosed under the NSL 
statutes. In 2007, the Internet Archive challenged an NSL on the 
grounds that 18 U.S.C. § 2709 did not apply to it because it was not 
an electronic communications service provider.
205
 It also claimed that 
it qualified as a library and thus fell under an exclusion that was 
carved out for libraries in the ECPA in 2006.
206
 In April 2008 the 
government withdrew the NSL and settled the case.
207
 Additionally, a 
2013 NSL issued to Microsoft was withdrawn after the company 
challenged it in court.
208
 
Further, between 2007 and 2009, at least two Internet companies 
took perhaps the strongest and most effective countermeasures 
against NSLs to date: like the Internet Archive, the companies 
refused to comply with NSLs on the grounds that the FBI was 
 
 202. Kris & Wilson, supra note 6, § 20:10. Compare 18 U.S.C.A. § 3511(a) with Fed. R. 
Crim. P. 17(c)(3) (stating a court may “quash or modify the subpoena if compliance would be 
unreasonable or oppressive”). 
 203. Id. 
 204. Id. 
 205. See Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Petition of Plaintiff Internet 
Archive to Set Aside National Security Letter, at 6–11, Internet Archive v. Mukasey, No. CV-
07-6346-CW (N.D. Cal. Dec. 14, 2007). 
 206. Id. 
 207. See Settlement Agreement, Internet Archive v. Mukasey, No. CV-07-6346-CW (N.D. 
Cal. Dec. 14, 2007).  
 208. Brad Smith, New Success In Protecting Customer Rights Unsealed Today, 
MICROSOFT ON THE ISSUES (May 22, 2014), http://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2014/05/ 
22/new-success-in-protecting-customer-rights-unsealed-today/, available at http://perma.cc/49 
CW-GY58. It appears the government obtained the information it sought through a different 
company. See In Re National Security Letter, No. C13-1048RAJ (W.D. Wash. 2014) (Order) 
available at http://blogs.technet.com/cfs-file.ashx/__key/communityserver-blogs-components-
weblogfiles/00-00-00-82-95/Unsealed-NSL-Challenge.pdf, available at http://perma.cc/W5YE-
FJCM. 
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requesting information that falls outside the four categories 
enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 2709.
209
  
In 2008, the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) in the DOJ released 
an opinion concluding that pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2709, only name, 
address, length of service, and local and long distance toll billing 
records may be disclosed by an NSL recipient.
210
 As a result of these 
conclusions, an Internet company took the position that “if the 
records identified in Section 2709(b) constitute the exclusive list of 
records that may be obtained through an ECPA NSL, then the FBI 
does not have the authority to compel the production of electronic 
communication transactional records because that term dos not 
appear in subsection (b).”211  
The OLC memo thereby creates the framework for a credible, 
non-constitutional challenge to an NSL by virtually all Internet 
companies. The importance of this development as a countermeasure 
to NSLs cannot be overstated. Indeed, the OIG of the DOJ wrote, 
“[t]he resolution of this issue has significant consequences for the 
FBI’s use of NSLs.”212 Further, the FBI, at least as of the issuance of 
the OIG of the DOJ report, has been unable overcome this 
opposition.
213
 The FBI has apparently been using FISA Section 215 
applications instead.
214
 
Indeed, although the FBI Office of General Counsel disagrees 
with the legal position asserted by the redacted Internet company 
 
 209. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T OF JUSTICE, A REVIEW OF THE FBI’S USE OF 
NATIONAL SECURITY LETTERS: ASSESSMENT OF PROGRESS IN IMPLEMENTING 
RECOMMENDATIONS AND EXAMINATIONS OF USE IN 2007 THROUGH 2009 (2014), at 71, 
http://www.justice.gov/oig/ reports/2014/s1408.pdf; see also Marcy Wheeler, The Majority of 
215 Orders Come from Internet Companies that Refuse NSLs, EMPTYWHEEL (Aug. 14, 2014), 
https://www.emptywheel.net/2014/08/14/the-bulk-of-215-orders-come-from-internet-companies-
that-refuse-nsls/, available at https://perma.cc/PG46-WHM5. 
 210. Requests for Info. under the Elec. Commc’n Privacy Act, 32 Op. O.L.C. 1, 1 (2008). 
However, it also concluded that “any call record that a communications provider keeps in the 
regular course of business and could use for billing a subscriber falls within the scope of section 
2709.” Id. at 11. This reading may expand the scope of information the government may 
request. 
 211. A REVIEW OF THE FBI’S USE OF NATIONAL SECURITY LETTERS: ASSESSMENT OF 
PROGRESS IN IMPLEMENTING RECOMMENDATIONS AND EXAMINATIONS OF USE IN 2007 
THROUGH 2009, supra note 209, at 72. 
 212. Id. 
 213. See id. at 73. 
 214. See id. 
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(based on the OLC opinion), “[w]hen the views of the Office of 
Legal Counsel are sought on the question of the legality of a 
proposed executive branch action, those views are typically treated as 
conclusive and binding within the executive branch. The legal advice 
of the Office, often embodied in formal, written opinions, constitutes 
the legal position of the executive branch, unless overruled by the 
President or the Attorney General.”215 Therefore, because the FBI’s 
General Counsel sought OLC’s opinion, the opinion is binding on the 
FBI (though the FBI may argue about the exact meaning of the OLC 
opinion). 
Based on the success of the Internet company that was redacted in 
the OIG of the DOJ report, all electronic communications companies 
could raise such an argument, forcing the government to make 
requests which require greater oversight, such as those requiring 
FISC approval.
216
 In fact, because companies that cooperate with the 
government too willingly risk lawsuits (despite statutory 
immunity),
217
 Internet companies should now consider the potential 
liability which might follow from not asserting that 18 U.S.C. § 2709 
does not apply to them. 
Not surprisingly, because a significant percentage of NSLs are 
issued to electronic communications companies, the FBI has 
considered proposing legislation that would explicitly allow 
 
 215. Randolph D. Moss, Exec. Branch Legal Interpretation: A Perspective from the Office 
of Legal Counsel, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 1303, 1305 (2000); see also Arthur H. Garrison, The 
Opinions by the Attorney General and the Office of Legal Counsel: How and Why They Are 
Significant, 76 ALB. L. REV. 217, 242–43 (2013) (explaining that “[t]he power of the Attorney 
General and the OLC to issue binding opinions of law within the executive branch is based on 
the opinions by Attorneys General Cushing, Legaré, Writ, Lincoln, Moody, Cummings, 
Johnson, Olney, and Bates, and Solicitor General Aldrich on the binding and quasi-judicial 
nature of their legal opinions; administrative tradition within the Executive Branch to honor the 
legal opinions of the Attorney General as legally binding; Executive Order 2877 issued by 
President Wilson (1918); Executive Orders 6166 (1933), 6247 (1933), and 7298 (1936) issued 
by President Franklin D. Roosevelt; Executive Order 12,146 issued by President Carter (1979); 
the creation of the Assistant Solicitor General (1933) with the specific task of preparing 
presidential orders and providing legal opinions to executive departments and the President 
under the name of the Attorney General; the transference of these responsibilities to the OLC 
(1953); and subsequent opinions issued by the OLC.”). 
 216. See supra note 214 and accompanying text. 
 217. See Fidler, supra note 22, at 69 n.58 (stating that “the threat of possible litigation is 
not insignificant.”). 
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electronic communication transaction records to be requested under 
18 U.S.C. § 2709.
218
 
F. Repercussions for Failing to Comply 
Failure to comply with an NSL carried no penalty until the 
passage of the USA PATRIOT Act Reauthorization in 2006.
219
 
Although the NSL statutes required a recipient to comply with an 
NSL, none of them specified any recourse for the government if a 
recipient failed to produce records in response to an NSL.
220
 The 
2006 Reauthorization Act allows the DOJ to “invoke the aid of any 
district court . . . within the jurisdiction in which the investigation is 
carried on” or where the recipient of the NSL “resides, carries on 
business, or may be found” to compel compliance with the request.221 
In response to a request from the DOJ, the court “may issue an order 
requiring the person or entity to comply” with the NSL.222 The statute 
does not make clear whether the court has discretion in ordering 
compliance with an NSL.
223
  
Failure to obey a court order under Section 3511(c) “may be 
punished by the court as contempt.”224 However, the statute does not 
specify whether a resistant recipient is subject to civil or criminal 
contempt. In light of the word “punish” in the statute, it has been 
suggested that a court would likely hold the resisting recipient in 
criminal contempt.
225
 A criminal contempt proceeding can be 
determined through a trial, and a defendant in a criminal trial has a 
constitutional right to a public trial.
226
 Although any sensitive 
information would likely be publicly withheld, an NSL recipient 
could thereby make it publicly known that it resisted a government 
 
 218. Id. 
 219. Kris & Wilson, supra note 6, § 20:11. 
 220. Id. 
 221. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3511(c). 
 222. Id. 
 223. Kris & Wilson, supra note 6, § 20:11. 
 224. Id. 
 225. Id.  
 226. See In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 276 (1948). 
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order, resulting in a contempt charge, though the fact that the order 
was an NSL may remain secret.
227
 
IV. LIKELIHOOD OF SUCCESS 
If challenged in court, the constitutionality of the warrant canary 
will likely hinge on whether prohibiting the warrant canary is 
narrowly tailored to promote a compelling government interest. 
Although no governmental interest is more compelling than the 
nation’s security,228 the government would have to show that 
requiring an entity to falsely state that it has never received an NSL is 
narrowly tailored to further national security.
229
 
As discussed in Gonzales, the court specified three safeguards that 
must be in place to ensure that an NSL statute is narrowly tailored.
230
 
There are, however, differences between the treatment of gag order 
provisions and warrant canaries, which make the analysis 
distinguishable. First, warrant canaries are usually in reports that 
cover long periods of time (six months or more), and they are often 
published well after the period described in the report.
231
 This has 
major repercussions for an analysis of the first Freedman 
safeguard
232—that the restraint must be for a specified, brief period. 
Because a delay is already built into most warrant canaries, the 
necessary period of non-disclosure will have already elapsed, and the 
government will find it much harder to prove any period of restraint 
from publishing is necessary. 
Additionally, because communications companies subject to 
NSLs generally have at least thousands of users,
233
 it is unlikely that 
any one person could assume he or she has been the target of an NSL. 
The knowledge that a large entity has received an NSL, in the 
 
 227. Kris & Wilson, supra note 6, § 20:11. 
 228. Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 307 (1981). 
 229. See supra note 156–63 and accompanying text. 
 230. Doe v. Gonzales, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 400. 
 231. See supra note 147 and accompanying text. 
 232. See supra note 160 and accompanying text. 
 233. See, e.g., Grading the top 8 U.S. wireless carriers in the third quarter of 2014, 
FIERCEWIRELESS (Nov. 10, 2014), http://www.fiercewireless.com/special-reports/grading-top-
8-us-wireless-carriers-third-quarter-2014?confirmation=123, available at http://perma.cc/H3 
BW-2HN2. 
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absence of more specific information about its target, is not valuable 
to an adversary of the nation and poses virtually no threat to national 
security. Indeed, this seems to be the premise behind the 
government’s DAG Letter framework. In fact, by allowing 
companies to abide by the DAG Letter framework, the government is 
implicitly conceding that aggregate statistics pose no threat to 
national security, undermining the argument that gag orders must be 
perpetual, and warrant canaries must be prohibited. 
Second, a prohibition on triggering a warrant canary, like the NSL 
gag order provisions, would be problematic because it would not 
require the government to initiate judicial review—the third 
Freedman safeguard. This can be seen in the current Twitter case.
234
 
Twitter sought to publish statistics regarding the receipt of national 
security requests (specifically, instances where it has received zero), 
but the government prohibited Twitter from doing so where Twitter 
was not the party to initiate judicial review.
235
 Twitter was obligated 
to seek the right to publish the statistics, rather than the government 
being obligated to go to court to stop the publishing of the statistics. 
This violates the requirement that the government initiate judicial 
review in exactly the way the Mukasey court explained is 
unconstitutional. 
Even if the government could not prohibit the use of a warrant 
canary, its utility is severely diminished by the fact that it can only be 
triggered once (at least for those canaries which state a company has 
never received an NSL or national security request). The government 
need only issue a single NSL to trigger such a canary, henceforth 
rendering it useless to that company (or requiring language 
specifying a time frame during which the canary was valid). The 
government could therefore strategically seek to trigger a warrant 
canary, disarming it going forward, robbing a company of the chance 
to alert users of the receipt of further NSLs. 
From the perspective of an Internet user or small company, 
subscribing to an ISP or telecommunications provider that will fight 
NSLs and retain as little data as possible is the best practical 
countermeasure to the NSL. All NSL recipients have the right to 
 
 234. See supra note 109 and accompanying text. 
 235. Id. 
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challenge an NSL and any applicable nondisclosure provisions in 
federal court. Because most ISP recipients see no benefit to 
challenging NSLs on behalf of customers who will never know an 
NSL was issued, challenges are extremely rare.
236
 However, some 
ISPs have committed to fighting NSLs, and those sensitive to NSLs 
should seek them out. The Electronic Frontier Foundation makes this 
task easier with its “Who Has Your Back?” reports detailing “[w]hich 
companies have resisted improper government demands by fighting 
for user privacy in the courts and on Capitol Hill.”237 With more 
widespread understanding of the 2008 OLC opinion, all Internet 
companies should consider whether they must assert that they do not 
fit within 18 U.S.C. § 2709 or risk facing liability from customers 
following inappropriate or inadvertent disclosures. 
Similarly, using an ISP that retains as little data as possible is an 
effective means to combatting NSLs because the requested 
information simply will not exist. Nonetheless, legislation such as the 
Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA) 
requires that telecommunications carriers modify their equipment, 
facilities, and services to ensure that they have built-in surveillance 
capabilities.
238
 This allows federal agencies to monitor all telephone, 
broadband Internet, and Voice over IP (VoIP) traffic in real-time.
239
 
Additional proposed legislation, such as the Protecting Children from 
Internet Pornographers Act of 2011, would require ISPs to retain 
identifiable user data for at least a year.
240
  
Tor is also an effective tool to prevent data collection obtainable 
through an NSL. However, Tor also has functional limitations, as 
evidenced by the government’s ability to identify child pornographers 
and managers of black markets, despite their usage of Tor.
241
 
 
 236. See supra note 176 and accompanying text. 
 237. Who Has Your Back? 2014: Protecting Your Data From Government Requests, ELEC. 
FRONTIER FOUND. (May. 15, 2014), https://www.eff.org/who-has-your-back-2014, available at 
https://perma.cc/3GGW-JVRD. 
 238. Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act 47 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1010 
(1994). See Barbara J. Van Arsdale, Annotation, Construction and Application of 
Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA), 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 1001 to 1010, 
25 A.L.R. FED. 2d 323 (2008). 
 239. Id. 
 240. H.R. 1981, 112th Cong. (2011). 
 241. See supra notes 181–82 and accompanying text. 
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Reidentifacation of anonymous users can occur by capitalizing on 
software flaws and through side-channel attacks. Nonetheless, as 
acknowledged by the NSA in slides leaked by Snowden, Tor remains 
one of the few areas the government has had little success 
compromising.
242
 
Moving servers outside the United States seems to be an effective 
method of avoiding NSLs.
243
 However, avoiding NSLs may come at 
the cost of exposing the servers to even greater scrutiny.
244
 
Companies outside of the United States are not subject to the 
protections guaranteed to American companies. The Fourth 
Amendment, for example, does not restrain the actions of the federal 
government against aliens outside of US territory.
245
 Additionally, the 
United States has signed treaties and agreements with many of the 
nations that could potentially act as hosts for servers.
246
 Many of 
these nations have even fewer protections preventing their 
governments from obtaining information at will.
247
 Once obtained, 
 
 242. ‘Tor Stinks’ presentation—read the full document, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 4, 2013), 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/oct/04/tor-stinks-nsa-presentation-document, 
available at http://perma.cc/S2AY-H7A5. 
 243. See Fidler, supra note 22, at 75 (stating that “international issues have not played a 
prominent role in the controversies about national security letters,” and explaining that DOJ 
OIG reports “do not mention international concerns.”); see also infra note 248 and 
accompanying text. 
 244. See supra notes 183–94 and accompanying text. 
 245. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 266 (1990). Although other 
statutes, internal policies, and international norms ostensibly place limits on the international 
acquisition of data, in the national security context, DOJ OIG reports regarding NSLs make 
clear the FBI often ignores statutory safeguards, and “[o]ccasionally, the U.S. government does 
not respect foreign laws blocking disclosure of information sought under subpoenas.” See 
Fidler, supra note 22, at 84–85. See also Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and the Global 
Internet, 67 STAN. L. REV. 285, 280 (2015) (arguing that “online contacts should not create 
Fourth Amendment protection under Verdugo-Urquidez. The Fourth Amendment should apply 
only when a person monitored has sufficient physical or legal contacts with the United States. 
Next, when the government does not know if a person monitored has Fourth Amendment rights, 
such monitoring should be deemed constitutional as long as investigators had a reasonable, 
good faith belief that their conduct complied with the Fourth Amendment.”). 
 246. See generally Treaties in Force, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/ 
documents/organization/218912.pdf (last accessed Feb. 22, 2015) (listing, among other treaties, 
mutual legal assistance treaties under which the US can request a foreign government pass 
along data from a foreign target). 
 247. See, e.g., Sweden Approves Wiretapping Law, BBC (June 19, 2008), http://news.bbc. 
co.uk/2/hi/europe/7463333.stm, available at http://perma.cc/3CXQ-XNMS; Andrei Soldatov & 
Irina Borogan, In Ex-Soviet States, Russian Spy Tech Still Watches You, WIRED (Dec. 21, 
2012), http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2012/12/russias-hand/all/, available at http://perma.cc/ 
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this data is likely to be shared under, for instance, a mutual legal 
assistance treaty,
248
 resulting in the US government acquiring the data 
faster and with less resistance than if an NSL were issued and 
fought.
249
 
Utilizing alternative networks and privacy-maximizing protocols 
are some of the best technological methods to avoid exposure to 
NSLs. Like keeping no logs of user data, the use of such networks 
and protocols would preclude the disclosure of user information, even 
if the government requested it. The downside to these 
countermeasures is that they essentially require recreating a 
worldwide network, rivaling the Internet, to be built from scratch. 
Realistically, the necessary interest to accomplish this goal will not 
exist in the near future. 
CONCLUSION 
 Assuming that NSLs are constitutional, there are a handful of 
countermeasures that companies and individuals may take to avoid 
exposure to the government’s requests for information. If properly 
situated, companies should be encouraged to fight NSLs where the 
government requests information outside of the scope of the NSL 
statutes. Some additional possibilities include creating a new, 
privacy-focused global network, and consistently using Tor. Both 
options, however, are expensive or inefficient. Others, such as 
limiting the gathering and retention of user logs, can be immediately 
implemented with limited expense. Although President Obama has 
announced modest reforms to the infinite gag orders that accompany 
NSLs, opponents to the instrument generally should campaign not 
only for changes to the NSL statutes, but for change to the policies of 
 
M9Z7-SA7N; Didi Kirsten Tatlow, U.S. Prism, Meet China’s Golden Shield, N.Y. TIMES (June 
28, 2013), http://rendezvous.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/06/28/u-s-prism-meet-chinas-golden-shield, 
available at http://perma.cc/2ASR-6XZL. 
 248. See Fidler, supra note 22 at 82 (stating that “we assume the federal government uses 
MLATS because national security letters issue without court involvement.”). A mutual legal 
assistance treaty “imposes a binding obligation on the treaty partners to provide specific 
categories of assistance to each other in designated types of criminal investigations and 
prosecutions.” James I. K. Knapp, Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties As A Way to Pierce Bank 
Secrecy, 20 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 405, 406 (1988). 
 249. See Farivar, supra note 194. 
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companies that are the most likely potential recipients of NSLs, 
making the tool less useful, and generally enhancing user privacy. 
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